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# REPORT FROM THE TRENCHES

Adopting the  
 Planned Growth Strategy  
 in Albuquerque, New Mexico

**PLANNED GROWTH STRATEGY**

PCS ATTACHED  
 2002

January, 2005

Prepared for the SURDNA FOUNDATION, INC.

The continuing Albuquerque saga  
**The Mayor vs The City Council**  
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**Report from the Trenches**  
**Adopting the Planned Growth Strategy**  
**In Albuquerque, New Mexico**

January 2005

Prepared for The Surdna Foundation

Louis J. Colombo, Ph.D.



## Introduction

The responsibilities of proponents of urban growth management and Smart Growth cannot be neatly fixed by beginning and end points. To view them in terms of the analysis of conditions, summary of past practice and the literature, and the formulation of plans would be shortsighted. Rather these responsibilities involve continual engagement in the largely political process of policy development, adjustment, and implementation. Even the best urban growth management plans based on most promising Smart Growth principles mean virtually nothing without the effective and often hard-edged political process of plan adoption and implementation.

This report covers the story of the implementation of the City of Albuquerque – County of Bernalillo Planned Growth Strategy. It is the (necessarily incomplete) story of years of work to change the community from reacting to private development initiatives to policy-driven urban growth and government management. It is the story of the business and political leaders of a community unwilling to accept a new approach to urban growth management, viewing the policy debate in fundamentally different terms, and perceiving an assault on their local control. It is one of the unexpected legislative victories of religious, neighborhood, environmental, good government groups, and newly elected officials, as well as the continuous efforts of developers and landowners with sizeable holdings on the urban fringe to stay engaged in the process and turn it to their advantage when the opportunities could be created. In short, it is a very critical story that is not told in books and journal articles.

This report covers the following topics:

- Summary of the Albuquerque – Bernalillo County Planning Growth Strategy (PGS) as contained in the plan report
- Overview of the political process of drafting the legislation based on the PGS report and its consideration, amendment, and adoption into law
- Description of the political context of the City of Albuquerque using the theoretical perspective of the “growth machine”. (Logan & Molotch, 1987)
- Description of the political contest surrounding adoption of the PGS reviewing the strategies, tactics, and activities of the elected officials supporting the PGS on the City Council, pro-PGS support organizations,

and the opponents of the plan. This is shown in the context of key “models” of political organizations, including campaigns, public interest groups, coalitions, and grass roots community organizations. An important aspect of this story is the evolution of strategies and tactics over time. This section will address the important amendments to the original PGS legislation and their implications

- The article concludes with lessons learned from these events that might inform future educational, organizing, and legislative activities.

This article is based on views from the “inside” of the political process. The author was employed as a senior staff member of the Albuquerque City Council, had more than 10 years experience observing local government there, drafted the scope of the Planned Growth Strategy study, acted as its project manager, wrote sections of the PGS report, drafted the Planned Growth Strategy legislation and some of its amendments, and advised the City Councilors sponsoring the legislation. Key informants for this article include Rev. Trey Hammond of La Mesa Presbyterian Church and Eleanor Milroy, chief organizer, representing Albuquerque Interfaith; Pam Riley, staff person for Supporters of the Planned Growth Strategy and 1000 Friends of New Mexico; City Councilor Michael Cadigan, sponsor of the PGS legislation; and an involved individual from the development community who has requested anonymity. These individuals have provided information from the perspectives of different types of political organizations:

- Hammond and Milroy – grass roots community group;
- Riley and the developer – public interest group, coalition, and campaign organization; and
- Cadigan and Colombo – local government.

The individuals responded (to varying degrees) to a set of questions about the political adoption process and provided calendars of their activities. In “The Character and Consequences of Growth Regimes, An Assessment of 20 Years of Research”, Logan, Whaley, and Crowder report that “Few researchers have attempted to study explicitly the internal workings of progrowth coalitions, the various roles played by their different members, the tactics these actors employ, the conflicts that develop among

them, or the variations in the efficacy with which various progrowth actors attack their task". (Logan, Whaley & Crowder, 1997, p. 610). While this article cannot claim to be a comprehensive perspective, it will add important information regarding the activities of developer and business leaders. In the following report, unattributed quotes are from confidential sources.

This report is based, in large measure, on combining these data and drawing conclusions based the relationships of the different perspectives. A very important product of the information provided is a combined calendar of specific activities. This is included as the first element of the Appendix.

### **Planned Growth Strategy Report: Summary and History**

Summary of the Planned Growth Strategy Report. A good urban growth management plan is a touchstone for community education and engagement in implementation activities. The Planned Growth Strategy report, made public in September 2001, is a coherent plan with substantial consistency. The PGS plan was issued in two volumes, Planned Growth Strategy, Part 1 - Findings Report and Planned Growth Strategy, Part 2 - Preferred Alternative, cost about \$400,000, and is over 750 pages in length.

The first phase of the study focused on the costs and benefits of alternative way of accommodating growth as expressed in the official forecasts of population, housing, and employment over a 25-year period. The consultant team in this phase was weighted heavily by engineering firms including Parsons, Brinkerhoff (P-B); Ch2M-Hill; Camp, Dresser & McKee; and Wilson and Company. Sites Southwest, Inc. and Michael McKee, Ph.D. also provided important products. The Planned Growth Strategy, Part 1 - Findings Report contained several sections covering development trends, alternative scenarios for growth for the following 25 years (called the "Trend", "Balanced", and "Downtown" scenarios), infrastructure provision costs for each of the alternatives as well as for rehabilitation and deficiency corrections, the economic impacts of these alternatives based on macro analysis econometric modeling, and a discussion of other social consequences (positive and negative) of urban growth. The work in this first phase and in the next was guided in critical ways by the public input obtained at two Town Halls and a number of citizen surveys.

In the second phase of the study, the information obtained through analysis of the three alternatives was combined into a Preferred Alternative land use plan. The bulk of the Planned Growth Strategy, Part 2 - Preferred Alternative report addressed recommendations to realize the Preferred Alternative. The consultant team for this phase consisted of Freilich, Leitner & Carlisle; Growth Management Analysts (Arthur C. Nelson, Ph.D.), Lora Lucero, Esq., and Friedmann Resources.

The Part 2 Report includes chapters on the establishment of the Preferred Alternative and its description, planning challenges related to Brownfield sites and obsolete and premature platted lands, zoning code and design standards, the capital improvement program, development impact fees, adequate public facilities ordinances, financial requirements to support the Preferred Alternative, incentives and inducements, regionalism, other recommended changes to growth related laws and regulations, and urban growth management practices in other locations.

Backstory: The Politics of the Planned Growth Strategy Report. Given the importance of a cogent and effective growth management plan, it is no surprise that its development also constitutes a political arena. The political story of the adoption of the Planned Growth Strategy extends to the shepherding of the plan through to publication, protecting it from those who intended to compromise the final product.

In actuality, the PGS began in 1995 with work by the City of Albuquerque on the Transportation Evaluation Study (TES). This effort was conceived by Ken Balizer, then director of the City Planning Department under Mayor Louis Saavedra, and carried out by the consulting firm Parsons Brinckerhoff under the project management of Sam Seskin. When the TES report was issued in 1997 it met significant opposition from major developers and business leaders. The opposition focused on the suggestion that an Urban Growth Boundary, with a 20-year inventory of developable land, be established for the Albuquerque metropolitan area. One of the spokespersons for the opposition was City Councilor Tim Cummins, who owned a real estate brokerage firm and was a real estate developer. Ultimately the Transportation Evaluation Study was legislatively “received” by the City Council, instead of “accepted”. By this time, Mayor Saavedra had been replaced in office by Martin Chavez, who removed Balizer as

Planning Director and placed him as head of the City's redevelopment agency within the Family and Community Services Department.

Councilor Cummins worked with Louis Colombo, the Deputy Director of the City Council Department, to refocus the urban growth management program on regulatory barriers to policy implementation, emphasizing zoning, requirements within sector plans, the development approval process, and the Capital Improvement Program including streets, hydrology, water, and wastewater provision. In other words, Cummins realized that regulatory, procedural, and financial impediments existed to constrain private development. He correctly understood that urban growth management was policy neutral and could be used to further the interests of developers or to allow the entire community to proactively direct its future.

He had little trust in the Planning Department's staff to take charge of the growth management plan and disagreed with the Department's director at the time who believed the plan's focus should be on policy. From his experience as a developer, he saw the Planning Department largely as obstructionist to growth. He wanted to keep the plan close to the City Council and believed that Colombo could guide this effort. Colombo had more than a decade's experience overseeing the budgets of the City's operating departments including Planning, the capital programs, and reviewing sector and area plans. In addition, he was Council staff assigned to development impact fees, managed a program review of the Water and Wastewater utility, and also held a doctorate in urban planning. Cummins believed that his own effectiveness on the City Council ultimately would determine the specifics of the adopted urban growth legislation. Cummins' role was complex: honestly believing that the development-related functions of local government should be reformed to work more smoothly and provide services in a timely way and, at the same time, wanting to align the process so that it served the interests of development and business stakeholders.

Colombo believed that an urban growth management system resting on a foundation of regulatory mechanisms could not be adopted legislatively due to the anticipated opposition of large developers and business interests. Rather, he thought that the system had to be grounded in financial tools and be relatively transparent in use. In other words, good growth management was believed to be more efficient, the

cost of development to the private sector should vary based on the cost to the community, and the calculation of these costs should be straightforward, if not necessarily simple. Growth management in Albuquerque would not be effected principally through regulatory mechanisms such as Urban Growth Boundaries and building permits quotas. Growth could take place in different locations if the developer assumed the relative cost associated with its location. In short, it was assumed that the variable cost of growth, on a marginal basis, would effectively guide growth in a way consistent with already adopted public policies supporting infill and redevelopment of older neighborhoods. Incentives for development were embraced (as espoused by developers), but they need to be linked to public policy in contrast to being applied across the board. This approach was something that Cummins could support.

The first critical political contest occurred before the PGS consultants were selected and revolved around control of the planning effort. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) Lawrence Rael opposed its management by Colombo in the Council office for several reasons. Fundamentally he understood that the plan was an important document and he needed staff reporting to him in order to monitor and control its content. This accomplished several purposes. It allowed the CAO to operate in the interests of his boss, the mayor. It helped strengthen the CAO's own political base among large developer and business interests. The CAO was largely averse to conflict and control would allow him to vet the growth plan and avoid any unexpected controversies. Lastly, Rael wished Administrative staff to report directly to him and to avoid any direct connection to the City Council that he had difficulty in mediating. Colombo realized that the CAO's control would compromise the growth plan from the onset and that his involvement had to be minimized in order to create an effective plan and reference document. After many heated discussions behind closed doors, this was resolved through the efforts of Councilor Cummins by creating a management committee consisting of one representative each from the City Council, the City Planning Department, and the Bernalillo County Commission.

The scope of consultant services was drafted by Colombo, again after conflict with the Planning Department in particular over its emphasis on the relative cost of growth under different scenarios. An exhaustive proposal review process took place

and the team assembled by Parsons Brinckerhoff was selected to lead the effort. Consultants were on-board and working by Spring of 1998.

From this time until the draft of the Part 1 – Findings Report was issued in January 1999, the consultant team focused on development trends, an inventory of developable and redevelopable land, three alternative 25-year growth scenarios based on the same official control totals of population, housing, and employment (called “Trend”, “Downtown”, and “Balanced”), the infrastructure (water, sewer, hydrology, transit, street) cost for serving these alternative growth patterns, and also the cost of addressing infrastructure rehabilitation and deficiencies over this period. A Town Hall was held on the Planned Growth Strategy involving all segments and stakeholders within the community and a draft report produced.

A political furor erupted when the draft report was issued, principally because it indicated that there were substantial infrastructure savings, over \$200 million dollars, for the planned growth scenarios compared to Trend. The development community and their supporters on the Bernalillo County Commission characterized the report in the media as “fatally flawed” from a technical standpoint. Interestingly, Parsons Brinckerhoff had acquired a local civil engineering firm in the months prior to release of the draft plan. This local affiliate was threatened in public hearings before the County Commission with loss of contracts over work conducted for the PGS. At one point, a principal in this firm undermined Seskin and the Parsons Brickerhoff product by also referring to it as inadequate. The County Manager’s office responded to pressure and pushed for Parsons and Seskin to be dropped from the contract. Colombo and Mark Sanchez, the Director of City Council Services, realized that the PGS project itself was threatened by the loss of the prime contractor and called a meeting with a P-B vice president and the local engineer over the flap. At that meeting, it was stated unambiguously to the company officer that the PGS work was not the problem; rather it was the turmoil being fueled by their own engineering staff sitting across the table. This checked one threat to the PGS. It is important to note that Colombo and Sanchez could not have been effective without the trust of a majority of the City Council who empowered them to carry the project through to its outcome.

The resolution of the political conflict engendered by the release of the Part 1 draft report consisted of several mid-course adjustments that actually delayed the project about one year. Developers' concerns were addressed by amending the PGS contract to add the following elements: (1) deconstructing the cost of growth in terms of that borne by the public sector and that paid by the private sector; (2) adding a new macro-economic analysis of the "benefits" of growth; and (3) conducting an analysis of potentially negative impacts of well-established local growth management programs (e.g. "Did growth jump over the municipal limits?", "Did growth management result in a loss of jobs?"). The PGS analysis in this phase of the project did not focus on whether or not growth paid for itself, which was seen as a rhetorical mire. It was to evaluate the potential financial benefits of accommodating the same amount of growth in different ways. The development community viewed this analysis through the political lens of whether it made an argument for growth being either "good" or "bad", a comment on their sensitivity to this political issue.

The PGS study took a very long detour to address these concerns in a systematic way. Separate studies were funded from the project financial reserve. Michael McKee, Ph.D., a University of New Mexico faculty member in Economics, conducted a macro analysis of the county economy under the difference scenarios. Colombo and other staff members worked with a committee representing developer stakeholders and with the PGS engineering subcontractors to disaggregate development costs into public and private expenditures. Friedmann Resources was contracted to undertake a survey of growth management practices and outcomes in about 30 towns and cities. A long list of detailed concerns was addressed in writing.

A second public Town Hall was held in August 1999 in order to specifically address the way in which large-scale Planned Communities (large, mixed-use, relative low-density communities generally located beyond the urban fringe) could be integrated into the PGS. Participants included:

- Reid Ewing, professor at Rutgers University and author of Best Development Practices: A Primer for Smart Growth and Transportation and Land Use Innovations,

- Doug Porter, director of the Growth Management Institute, former director of research at the Urban Land Institute,
- Arthur C. Nelson, professor of city planning at George Institute of Technology and national expert on infrastructure finance and impact assessment,
- Judy Corbett, director of the California Local Government Commission,
- John Laswick, manager of the City of Tucson's Sustainable Communities Program,
- Lee Rayburn, director of planning and design at Civano, a New Urbanist community in Tucson, and
- Roger Galatas, former CEO of The Woodlands, a 26,000 acres master planned community outside of Houston.

At the forum, Doug Porter, author and nationally respected expert on growth management, referred to Planned Communities as the “800 lb gorilla” impacting urban areas. He advised that these Communities should not be considered to be “stand alone” places and that they not be allowed to drain the vitality from the existing urban area.

From January 1999, Colombo assumed the day-to-day management role of the PGS. In the final analysis, all of the collaborative effort made little difference to the political reaction to the PGS legislation by development interests described below. However, the work did produce a sounder intellectual basis for the final PGS report, convince more moderate members of developer and business stakeholders that a earnest effort was being made to address their concerns, and protect the PGS project itself.

By the time the revisions to the PGS, Part 1 Findings Report were completed about in December 1999, many were restless about the slow progress of the report. The next phase of the project, the development of the Part 2 – Preferred Alternative, was conducted largely in-house by the PGS technical committee, assisted by Phyllis Taylor of Sites Southwest, a local planning consulting firm. The first attempt to move forward the 25-year land use plan was telling in terms of the engagement of developer stakeholders. Late in 1999, a large group was assembled to obtain direction on the PGS land use plan. During this meeting, a principal of Consensus Planning raised

several contentious issues and the meeting was unable to progress. Consensus Planning was engaged by several large-scale landowners (Black Ranch, Westland Development Corporation, and Campbell Ranch) to produce master planned communities at and beyond the urban fringe. While a follow-up meeting was held, the work on the Preferred Alternative land use plan turned inward with weekly meetings of City and County staff and Taylor from Sites Southwest.

A draft summary of the Preferred Alternative land use plan, covering the analysis underlying the creation of the land use plan and also a potential "tier" basis of development impact fees was completed and presented to the PGS Advisory Committee on June 1, 2000. By July 3, the PGS Management Committee received a single-spaced, uniformly critical memo from the NAIOP Planned Growth Strategy Management Committee. (NAIOP Planned Growth Strategy Committee, personal communication, July 3, 2000) The PGS Management provided a detailed response at the end of August 2000. (Planned Growth Strategy Management Committee, personal communication, August 29, 2000) At this early point NAIOP was increasingly assuming a negative and defensive posture.

The sections of the PGS Report addressing implementation concepts were drafted by the consultants, Freilich, Leitner & Carlisle and Growth Management Analysts, between September and December 2000. The *Albuquerque Tribune* printed a feature story in October 2000 entitled: "Planned-Growth Detour. Development of the City-County Planned Growth Strategy has slowed to a crawl as differences on major issues throw up roadblocks". ("Planned-growth detour", 2000) The text of the PGS Report was edited and sent to word processing for production beginning in January 2001. The production of this large document continued through Summer 2001.

In October 2001, the City Council / Bernalillo County Commission PGS Policy Committee, consisting of largely of elected officials, met to review the completed plan. (Colombo, notes, October 2001) They were asked whether this PGS Report itself should be submitted to additional public review and comment. The agreement at the meetings was "let's all support and move forward" without further review and amendment of the plan itself. It was agreed that the public focus should be on the legislation to implement the PGS, not on the report itself. Members of the Policy

Committee present believed that additional review would delay and undermine the progress of implementing the PGS.

The two volume PGS Report was released to the public in September 2001. The document had come through a politically fraught process throughout its six-year history, extending back to 1995. Despite attempts to delay, undermine, halt, criticize, and dismiss the work, the Planned Growth Strategy report emerged largely unscathed. It was a coherent urban growth management program that informed the Planned Growth Strategy legislation and catalyzed public support for the effort.

The skeptics wondered whether it would become yet another in a long series of hopeful plans that would gather dust on the shelves. Both the Transportation Evaluation Study and the PGS Report warned of the “disconnect” between well-founded development policies and the structure of regulations, laws, processes, and charges that actually controlled what was built. (Miller, 1996; City of Albuquerque, 1991b, pp. 223-226, 343-344) A great deal had been accomplished by September when the PGS report was issued, but the local track record of turning good reports into adopted legislation and then into implemented programs was dismal. PGS supporters wagered that carrying out this contentious contest in a public arena, rather than behind closed doors with stakeholders, was the real prospect for success.


#### Planned Growth Strategy Legislation: Bill No. O-02-39 and Successor Legislation.

The legislative process for the Planned Growth Strategy extended for about one year from August 2001 to October 2002, beginning with the release of the PGS report through the signing into law of the legislation by Mayor Martin Chavez. This history is summarized in a Master Calendar of Events provided in the Appendix. A calendar of the legislative events is contained in Table 1, following.

The first half of the 14-month period was uneventful. The PGS Report had been made public and was made available for public review and comment.

From September through the end of 2001, Colombo held a series of briefings on the Planning Growth Strategy with City Councilors, city council and mayoral candidates, the Chamber of Commerce, Economic Forum, the mayor of the Village of Los Ranchos, City department officials, and 1000 Friends of New Mexico, a statewide Smart Growth group.

**Table 1. Calendar of Legislative Events Adoption of Planned Growth**



The October City Council election resulted in three new players who would form the core of support for PGS legislation: Michael Cadigan, Miguel Gomez, and Eric Griego. Cadigan campaigned on the need for an urban growth plan and the problems experienced in his Westside district from roads and schools lagging behind development.

The Planned Growth Strategy adoption legislation was drafted between January and April 2002. During this period, Colombo met regularly with Councilor Cadigan, who would become the legislation's principal spokesperson. While this was occurring, additional briefings and meetings were held with many elected officials, governmental, community, and business organizations.

The Planned Growth Strategy bill was introduced at the Council meeting on May 6, 2001 and assigned the reference Bill No. O-02-39. The legislation marked a sea-change in the municipal government's approach to development. The participants in the PGS Town Halls said that they wanted a "different, more intentional approach to growth that is not reactive or

piecemeal but instead follows carefully considered principles". (City of Albuquerque, 1991b, p. 22). Bill No. O-02-39 was drafted to follow this direction without compromise as introduced.

The original PGS legislation had five sponsors, enough to assure passage but not to withstand the mayoral veto that was expected. Councilor Michael Cadigan was the bill's chief spokesperson, sharing the most visible leadership with Councilor Eric Griego. Two potential swing votes were identified in the legislative body, Councilors Brad Winter and Greg Payne. In general, Councilor Winter viewed as the more reliable potential endorser; however, the councilor came under considerable pressure from his own Republican Party and from development and business interests to oppose or, failing that, slow the process. Councilor Winter sought the middle ground and attempted to secure an acceptable compromise to all parties.

Consequently, the pace of legislative adoption slowed in May and the first weeks of June. The opposition to Bill No. O-02-39 identified several contentious issues. These were hammered on in media statements and at public hearings. Some of the concerns were picked up by neighborhood associations and affordable housing advocates that had been expected to support the PGS.

By the June 19 Council meeting, the PGS opposition was fully mobilized and requested the creation of a PGS Citizens Task Force to study and potentially propose amendments to the bill. The Task Force concept was supported by Councilor Winter and was created with 12 members (three Councilors, three developer representatives, three neighborhood association representatives, and four at-large members). The balance of power within the Task Force was predominately on the side of PGS opponents or skeptics. The next Council meeting date, the date on which the bill was intended to be voted upon, was set for August 15.

This deadline set up the most visible community engagement in favor of and opposed to the PGS. Two bills were drafted to substitute for the original legislation, Bill Nos. F/S O-02-39 and R-02-111, and included several amendments, some of which were of a clarifying nature and some substantive. These bills were introduced at the August 5 City Council meeting and were intended to be considered on August 15.

At the August 15 meeting, the Task Force requested more time and this request was supported by Councilor Winter. The bills were referred to a September 23 meeting date. In the following month, the political activity external to the Council's PGS Task Force subsided and the activity moved into an enclosed meeting room. The PGS opponents could not shake the resolve of the PGS bill sponsors. They revised their strategy and focused on amending the PGS bills through the Citizens Task Force (discussed in the report below). More damaging amendments were proposed at the Task Force, some of which passed and some voted down. The groups opposing the PGS also were drawing on their relationship with the Mayor to push forward amendments through Council channels.

Two additional substitute bills were drafted for F/S O-02-39 and F/S R-02-111 and received the tepid endorsement of the PGS Citizens Task Force at the September 23 City Council hearing. Amendments to the bills by Councilor Cadigan made up part of the ground loss through Task Force changes. Both bills were adopted by 7-2 votes, winning the support of both Councilors Winter and Payne. Mayor Chavez was unwilling to oppose the popular tide of PGS support, realizing that his veto would likely have little effect, and signed both bills by October 2002.

This narrative, although informative, is pallid in comparison to the action, reaction, emotions, and often clamorous public meeting and media activities that made up the events constituting the PGS legislative contest. This report is not focused on a simple description of events, but rather on telling the story in a way that can inform efforts in support of well-grounded urban growth management based in part on Smart Growth principles.

### **Albuquerque and the Growth Industry**

In an important political science case study described in Who Governs?, Dahl argued that local politics are characterized by shifting coalitions, a wide range of issues, and fragmented elites. (Dahl, 1961) However, a recent review of twenty years of research found that there is a "remarkable consensus today among urban theorists that growth is at the core of local politics". (Logan, Whaley & Crowder, 1997) This research explored the claim by Molotch in "The City as a Growth Machine" that growth policy was the central concern around which local governments are organized. (Molotch, 1976)

Logan and Molotch in Urban Fortunes are especially informative in this matter. They posit that cities are built on parcels of land and these parcels take the characteristics of monopolies as a result of their location and access to other land and uses. In the United States, control over land uses, infrastructure and other services, and taxes and charges on property are made principally by local governments. The authors wrote: “Structural speculators” are “driven to organizational manipulations” to “create differential rents [returns to property] by influencing the large arena of decision-making that will determine locational advantages”. (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 30)

Inter-locking progrowth associations and governmental units form a virtual “growth machine” whose behavior “involves exploiting virtually every institution in our political, economic, and cultural systems”. (Logan & Molotch, 1987, pp. 33-34) Members of the growth industry attempt to control critical local governmental decision-making in a number of ways:

- being elected to office or appointed to boards and commissions,
- making substantial campaign contributions,
- engaging in political issue-oriented campaigns when pressed upon them,
- constantly monitoring and intervening in local governmental decisions, either directly or through the actions of lawyers and lobbyists,
- mobilizing interlocking industry advocacy organizations,
- lobbying the print and electronic media, and so on.

Logan and Molotch found that these “elites use their growth consensus” to attempt to eliminate “any alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community.” (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 51)

The research reviewed found a number of different governance “regimes” within towns and cities. On one extreme, there were “entrepreneurial” regimes such as in Dallas where progrowth elites had a “relatively unimpeded alliance . . . that is able to shape the working of city political institutions”. (Elkins, 1987, p. 61). Perhaps the other end of the spectrum was in San Francisco where an “antiregime” operates to “obstruct and complicate the exercise of power”. (DeLeon, 1992, p. 555)

Prior to the Planned Growth Strategy, Albuquerque might be characterized as having a “facilitator” or progrowth group comprised of overarching business and

development organizations that led economic growth and development efforts (including the Albuquerque Economic Forum, Albuquerque Economic Development, Inc., Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce, and the local chapter of the National Association of Office and Industrial Properties (NAIOP). The NAIOP president said, regarding Albuquerque's mayor Martin Chavez, "We're thankful we have someone on our side at City Hall". (Newscity, 2003, p. 8)

At the same time, Albuquerque had evolved an "antiregime" of neighborhood associations that often contested and slowed growth in their backyards but had not yet established a proactive growth management program. Albuquerque experienced many years of conflict among local government, developers, and neighborhood associations. The planning commission and planning department were viewed by neighborhood association leaders as mostly taking sides with the developers. In a development approval process that was perceived to work behind closed doors and out of their control, associations raised the barricades in an attempt to protect adopted sector plans. By 2001, research conducted for a proposed amendment to the Comprehensive Plan determined that "many Albuquerque residents have lost faith in local leadership to implement plans." (Shared Vision, 2001)

### **The Adoption of the Planned Growth Strategy**

The political environment was both contentious and in flux at the time the Planned Growth Strategy legislation was introduced in May 2001. The following sections deal, in turn, with the activities of each of the principal political actors in the process: the elected officials who provided leadership for the PGS legislative process and support staff, community supporters of the PGS, and PGS opponents.

#### Models of Action and Roles.

The PGS adoption reflected distinct models of action and roles, individual actors, strategies and tactics, and their interaction and adjustments to the dynamic flow of events. This section briefly identifies the actors and their primary roles among both PGS proponents and opponents. The agents of change included:

- elected officials,
- technical staff,
- political campaign organizations,

- public interest groups,
- coalitions, and
- grass roots organizations.

Perhaps the most important lesson is that each of these organizations has a distinct and important role in the adoption of legislation such as the Planned Growth Strategy.

A brief description of the models / roles follows below.

*Elected officials.* Before they cast votes on legislation, elected officials must take time to comprehend complex issues; provide leadership to represent the issue and legislation to community groups, the media, other officials, and citizens; approve the substance of the initial legislation and make amendments to bills; and help coordinate the internal legislative process with external political support.

*Technical support staff.* Urban growth management is a complex issue requiring technical expertise from support staff. In the barrage of information, meetings, and decisions that elected officials and business and development leaders face, they typically rely on the interpretation and advice of technical support staff. Technical staff for elected officials draft and revise legislation and are asked to comment on the advisability of proposed amendments. They also propose responses to letters, and draft editorials and press releases. They are sometimes directed to speak about the issue with reporters, public interest and industry groups. Technical support staff play a critical "bridging" role in bringing complex materials into the public legislative adoption process. When they are effective, they allow opponents to see common ground that often exists. When they are destructive, they encourage divisions where they do not actually exist.

*Political campaign organizations.* Political campaign operations are characterized by central organizing principles, hierarchical structures, use of professionals, and they are technique-oriented. Campaign operations usually consist of a campaign manager, polling, computer lists and direct mail operations, an advertising agency, and television and radio production. One author said: "A campaign must be run by a campaign manager . . . You cannot run a campaign by a committee." (Gersten, 1976, p. 173) The campaign work itself is directed to political decisions at deadlines. Campaign events are compressed into short time periods and the campaign is focused

on total victory. Campaign managers attempt to stay on the offensive politically in the context of an overall strategy. They act primarily to activate the undecided and to reinforce supporters, guided by survey results. Political campaigns substitute money for organization and relatively large investments are used to birth "instant organizations." The literature indicates that paid media are the most effective at reinforcing attitudes that already exist and influencing those who are undecided. (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947, pp. 412-423)

*Public interest groups.* Public interest groups generally represent unorganized people who "too often do not have advocates or representatives on a day-to-day basis, before decision-making forums". (Brager and Speck, 1973, p. 263). The work is largely professional: researchers and lawyers often represent the interests of a broad constituency. These interests are defended before technical, legislative, judicial, and regulatory bodies. The intervention often is combined with high media visibility to build general political force. The assumption is that, rationally, as individuals, people will exert political pressure based on information. A former director of the Consumer's Union stated: public interest groups "usually lack a well-organized network capable of mobilizing the grass roots voters" to which elected officials are most responsive. As a result, public interest group roles mostly involve "servicing, steadying, and supporting" their allies. (Schuck, 1977, p. 135)

*Coalitions.* Coalitions are a common, visible force in mainstream political activity. Political scientist V. O. Key viewed political activity principally as an endless struggle of "building and holding coalitions together". (Key, 1952, p. 24). Coalitions build on the political power of existing organizations, form quickly, and express greater power than the sum of the power of the members. (Gamson, 1975, pp. 5-12) They typically are short-term efforts focused on single issue, usually with an established decision date. They dissipate in strength when the issue is not pressing and usually dissolve when the issue has been resolved. (Crowfoot, n.d., pp. 8-2, 8-6) Varied organizational goals and affiliations lead to an uncertain base for long-term political work. Coalitions usually are coordinating mechanisms, with the member organizations responsible for the political activity. They are strengthened by a well-defined decision-making structure involving the participation of as many groups as possible. Close communication and the rapid

flow of information is critical. (Crowfoot, n.d., p. 8-1). Coalitions are formed when the opposition is stronger than any one member, and they must be drawn from a base sufficiently broad and powerful to affect the political outcome.

*Grass roots organizations.* Similar to public interest and coalition activities, grass roots organizing is grounded in pluralist politics - although Alinsky, arguably the father of grass roots organizing, believed the work was essential for the "have nots", those without money and power. Early in life Alinsky worked primarily with low income communities, but later he joined forces with the middle class who were, he believed, "threatened by all sides" and worried about jobs, health care, retirement, and taxes. (Alinsky, 1969; Alinsky, 1972)

Grass roots organizers believe that it is critical for communities to possess, build, and exercise power. Power is the "ability to act": the ability of individuals and groups to reach their goals and objectives. Alinsky wrote that "power and organization are one and the same" (Alinsky, 1972, p. 113). Through organization, people come to realize the interconnection of what appear to be individual problems and to create a program of action that is "broad, deep, and all-inclusive". (Alinsky, 1969, p. 56) Building community power involves individuals connecting "publicly and formally", forming relationships that have purpose and discipline. (Gecan, 2002, p. 21) Each participant is considered a community "leader".

Power is enhanced through political action. According to the Industrial Areas Foundation's (IAF) training, political action is carefully unfolded through a system of community "kitchen" meetings, education, identification of strategies and tactics, execution, and evaluation. The organization has multiple issues that overlap in order to retain positive political momentum.

Under Ernesto Cortez' leadership in Texas, the Industrial Areas Foundation intentionally "reclaim[ed] the emancipatory currents of the Judeo-Christian heritage", the requirements of service to those in need, and the dignity of the poor. (Shirley, 1997, p. 38) Part of the community organizing focus of the Texas IAF affiliate has been engaging communities and religious organizations to improve the performance of public schools.

Roles in the Albuquerque PGS Contest.

The section above describes the models of political action and roles. Table 2 below indicates which individuals and groups in Albuquerque acted in a manner consistent with the models and roles.

**Table 2. Identification of Actors According to Roles in Albuquerque**

Models and Roles	PGS Supporters	PGS Opponents
Elected Officials and Technical Support Staff	City Councilors: Michael Cadigan, Eric Griego, Hess Yntema, Miguel Gomez, Vince Griego; Louis Colombo, Support Staff	Mayor Martin Chavez; City Councilors Sally Mayer, Tina Cummins, and Greg Payne; Karen Marcotte, NAIOP; Consensus Planning, Inc., Support Staff
Public Interest Group / Industry Group	1000 Friends of N.M.	National Association of Office and Industrial Properties (NAIOP). To a lesser extent: Albuquerque Economic Forum, Greater Albq. Chamber of Commerce, Home Builders Assoc. of Central NM
Coalition	Friends of the Planned Growth Strategy, Albuquerque Interfaith, 1000 Friends of N.M., Albuquerque Friends Meeting, League of Women Voters, Sawmill Neighborhood Assoc., Sage Council, NM Public Interest Research Group (NMPIRG), NM Council of Churches, 18 neighborhood and home owners groups, and over 100 businesses and individual endorsers	NAIOP, Albuquerque Economic Forum, Greater Albq. Chamber of Commerce, Home Builders Assoc. of Central NM, Build NM, Associated Builders and Contractors, Albq. Economic Development; Karen Marcotte, NAIOP; Consensus Planning, Inc., Support Staff
Campaign Organization	Soltari, Inc.	D. W. Turner Public Relations
Grass Roots Organization	Albuquerque Interfaith	None

Elected Officials Leading the PGS Legislative Effort and Support Staff.

The role of elected leadership in the growth management efforts can not be minimized. Research shows that the formation of a support coalition combining a heterogeneous range of interests requires the political leadership of a catalyst for change, typically an

elected official. (Schneider & Teske, 1993). In Albuquerque, that role was played principally by City Councilors Michael Cadigan and Eric Griego. This description is focused on Councilor Cadigan, a study informant, who was the PGS bill's principal legislative sponsor and spokesperson. This report will shed some light on the nature and importance of their elected leadership roles and, secondarily, on the contribution of technical support staff.

*Strategic Approach to PGS Bill No. O-02-39.* At the end of March 2001, Colombo had completing drafting the PGS bill and its content had been reviewed on a regular basis by Cadigan. Conversations were held among City Councilors and a majority of members indicated support. A critical meeting was held among some of these officials and Council staff in the first week of April. The draft legislation clearly directed the creation of a comprehensive financial and regulatory system to implement the Planned Growth Strategy. At the meeting, Council staff reviewed the bill's content, especially what were likely to be its most controversial elements. The elected officials made a series of decisions that defined the political contest to follow. These included the following.

- Proceed with the bill as drafted and do not anticipate the legislative compromises that might be necessary later through early changes.
- Introduce the legislation as an Ordinance rather than as a Resolution to have greater consequences on subsequent municipal actions that were necessary to fully implement the Planned Growth Strategy.
- Do not seek joint legislative drafting and adoption by the County of Bernalillo, which had co-sponsored the PGS Report, but support their independent consideration of PGS legislation. Jointly drafting growth management legislation with the County was thought to compromise what could be adopted by City government.
- Include the signatures of a majority (and preferably six members) of the City Council on the PGS legislation as it was introduced. This signaled that the bill was very likely to be adopted.
- Move toward legislative adoption as soon as possible to forestall efforts to contest and compromise the approach.

When the PGS bill was introduced on May 6 consistent with the approach outlined, members of the Albuquerque progrowth leadership were stunned: it caused a "shock wave through the development community", causing people to be "entrenched, polarized".

All study respondents were asked whether it would have been better to introduce the bill without co-sponsors indicating its very likely approval. In other words, was meaningful compromise with the PGS opponents possible? After PGS adoption, the chronology of events and other reports revealed that the anti-PGS coalition, New Mexicans for Smart Growth (NMSG), "was never in support of [the] Ordinance. They wanted to fight it from the beginning". The PGS legislation was introduced in the first week of May 2002. In less than two weeks, a strident anti-PGS television script had been written but came into the hands of PGS supporters. The very introduction of legislation immediately triggered work on a high visibility anti-PGS campaign sponsored by NAIOP.

Would it have been better to include the County of Bernalillo Commissioners as partners in the PGS legislation? The picture that results from the respondents is mixed. On the negative side, excluding the County Commission played into the political stereotypes that exploited conflict between the City and County and was used to justify the County's later opposition. In the main, however, at least two Commissioners at the time were close to large-scale developers, which would have put former City Councilor, now County Commissioner, Tim Cummins in a critical position. Consequently, it was likely that the PGS would have been delayed and altered had it proceeded as a combined legislative effort with the County.

From the perspective of the pro-PGS coalition respondent, introducing PGS Bill No. O-02-39 in the way done was "almost entirely positive". (Riley) The bill served to increase the credibility of the PGS and its supporters, identified the Councilor sponsors and kept them committed, and indicated who the swing votes on Council might be. In short, given that the PGS opponents were inflexibly opposed, the political fight was already defined and a very strong start was appropriate.

*Importance of Elected Leadership and the City Council.* The calendar of PGS events indicates an almost bewildering set of responsibilities that Cadigan assumed as

legislative leader for the Planned Growth Strategy. Within a six month period, he was involved in more than 90 separate meetings or presentations related to this role. This is even more astounding when one realized that the PGS was but one piece of legislation among the literally hundreds which came before the Council during these months, including the adoption of the annual budget. A City Councilor's salary was \$7,500 per year and Cadigan practiced law professionally full-time in addition to his Council duties.

The following represents the different roles that Cadigan carried out during this period:

- Mastered urban growth management techniques and the details of the 33 page PGS Ordinance so that he could make public presentations; answer questions from the media, elected officials, supporters and opponents; debate the issue; and be able to make decisions related to altering the approach through bill amendments.
- Made public presentations regarding the PGS legislation and elicited support for it. The PGS calendar indicates that Cadigan made over 30 presentations to neighborhood associations and coalitions, affordable housing builders and advocates, informational sessions organized by 1000 Friends of New Mexico and Albuquerque Interfaith, and other professional and community organizations.
- Represented the PGS legislation before the print and electronic media, making more than over 10 formal contacts with the media including interviews with newspaper feature story writers, radio shows, tapings of government television background media, and critical meetings with newspaper editorial staff writers. Early important feature stories on the Planned Growth Strategy appeared in the *Albuquerque Tribune* ("The Course of Improvement", 2002; "Just the Beginning", 2002) and are attached to this report. In addition, Cadigan wrote letters to the editor and guest editorials in the local newspapers to respond to criticisms of the PGS legislation.
- Met with members of the Albuquerque progrowth leadership (National Association of Office and Industrial Properties, Albuquerque Economic Forum, Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce, Albuquerque Economic Development) who opposed the Planned Growth Strategy and attempted to

convince Cadigan to compromise the legislation. The progrowth leadership systematically brought local elected officials into their membership activities, breakfasts, lunches, informational presentations, annual banquets, and more. They were accustomed to having access to these officials. Cadigan met with these groups 11 times, almost all during the final four months of the adoption period, a frequency equal to the number of meetings with PGS support groups. He was able to stay the course in the face of the mind-set shared by these groups: that government attempts to guide growth will only restrict it; government's proper role is to encourage and subsidize growth, never to take an action that might discourage it; and that the only persons who truly should be heard on growth and development issues, the most knowledgeable people, were those directly engaged in it.

- Managing the dynamic nature of the political process as it evolves over time, is a critical element of the leadership role. This meant withstanding frontal attack, blunting and reversing the impact of threats, holding the five Councilor bill sponsors together as they came under political pressure, protecting supporters, confronting opponents to just the proper degree, coordinating the campaign linking the "outside game" of the community work with the "inside game" of the legislative process and, in the PGS situation, winning the critical sixth Council vote that would allow the bill to withstand a mayoral veto. Cadigan's efforts in this area were mostly effective. At some key junctures, another Council sponsor, Eric Griego, stepped in and made important contributions.
- While all PGS bill sponsors came under political attack from the progrowth leadership, Councilor Cadigan was most vulnerable for several reasons, principally that his district was divided by partisan affiliation and the neighborhood coalition president there was strongly aligned with Mayor Martin Chavez, an ally of the business leaders. By the first week of June, the president of the Westside Coalition in Cadigan's district had invited several anti-PGS speakers to address the group. At the height of the progrowth leadership's attempt to discredit and defeat the legislation in late June and July, a recall campaign was started against Cadigan. The PGS legislation was represented as

harmful to Cadigan's district, drawing away tax dollars, and undermining neighborhood "sector" plans. The campaign attempted to leverage Cadigan's recall on this fulcrum. Opponents played hard-ball politics to distract and discourage him in the middle of a intense campaign to obtain the bill's adoption. Cadigan turned aside these efforts by concentrated attention to his political base in the district and amending the PGS legislation (as discussed below).

## New Mexicans for Smart Growth, Proposed TV Spot #2

<p>This is Albuquerque.          New jobs. New Businesses. New Families          From the Foothills to the West Side          We've always had choices.          Choices where to live, build new homes.          Or start a new business          In safe neighborhoods          Where our children and families can grow</p>	<p>Various aerial shots of Albuquerque          * New neighborhoods          * New developments          * The new interchange</p> <p>CUT TO:          A construction crew building a new home.</p> <p>CUT TO:          A park with families enjoying life.</p> <p>CUT TO:          A FAMILY at home</p>
<p>But the city bureaucrats want to take that choice away          The city's planned growth strategy will drive up the price of new homes, leaving you with few options.</p>	
<p>And this is where they think you should live.</p>	<p>CUT TO:</p> <p>A dirt lot sandwiched between two run down buildings</p> <p>The same family from above wanders about the dirt lot, with inquisitive faces.</p>
<p>Don't let them take away your choice and our future.</p>	<p>BLACK SCREEN WITH LETTERS</p>
<p>Call your city councilor today and tell them what you think about the Planned Growth Strategy.</p>	<p>Call you [sic] City Councilor today.</p>

- Sometimes the force of one's opponents can be used against them, in a sort of political *jui jitsu*, as Alinsky observed. (Alinsky, 1972, pp. 136-138) About a week after the PGS bill was introduced, the script for an anti-Planned Growth Strategy paid television campaign was leaked to the Council. (See text box) This inflammatory message presented a challenge to the PGS effort. Cadigan wished to avoid a direct confrontation with the progrowth leadership and to preserve the possibility of compromise while discouraging their media campaign. But the anti-PGS campaign was fully engaged even at this early date. After a two week delay, Councilor Griego released the script to the media

and condemned the message. The leadership of the anti-PGS coalition, New Mexicans for Smart Growth, disavowed the advertisement and it never aired.

- Councilors Cadigan and Griego did an effective job of coordinating the legislation activities with those of the pro-PGS community coalition. This was critical to avoid the insularity of the legislative process, strengthen the community forces in favor of the Planned Growth Strategy, and bring the weight of their efforts to bear on the Council's decisions. This joint effort began early. At the time the PGS bill was introduced, Cadigan and Griego met together with the PGS coalition members to solicit funds from a local foundation. In all, 11 coordinating sessions were held between May and September, with the pace of the meetings increasing during late summer and fall.
- Cadigan did less well protecting Council staff and keeping them in the center of the action. Colombo had drafted parts of the Planned Growth Strategy report and the adopting legislation. The anti-PGS campaign attacked him personally, stressed his relationship with Cadigan, and weakened his role in the legislative process. When one of the anti-PGS Councilors asked that Colombo not be allowed to attend Citizen Task Force meetings, Cadigan agreed. On his behalf, Cadigan believed that this was necessary in order to reach consensus on the Task Force and to win Councilor Winter's critical sixth vote. The effect was, however, to make it difficult to consider carefully the amendments being proposed by the anti-PGS members of the committee.
- The majority of the City Council sponsoring the Planned Growth Strategy legislation made critical resources available, and the simple engagement of strong leadership on the City Council carried with it significant political benefits. These are summarized in the text box below.

#### Council Resources

- Protecting the integrity of the Planned Growth Strategy report against attempt to dilute the findings.
- Holding hearings on the Planned Growth Strategy and setting the agenda for those hearings.
- Placing information related to the PGS on the Council's web site
- Producing and broadcasting government television shows.
- Providing the media with stories and guest Opinion-Editorial columns.
- Budgeting funds to conduct a media relations campaign, resulting in the development of the PGS brochure included in the report Appendix.
- Controlling other issues of interest to the political contestants in the PGS campaign. (Developers are before the City Council on a regular basis seeking approvals. To a degree this tempers their comments in public venues at least.)
- Establishing citizen review committees for proposed legislation, determining the representation on those committees, and voting to appoint their members.
- Controlling the phasing of Council meetings and votes on the Planned Growth Strategy legislation.

- For City elected officials, an issue like the Planned Growth Strategy is one of thousands of political and budget issues that come before them. Many of these are not neatly confined to municipal government but have intersections with County, State, and Federal governments and with special government agencies such as the Council of Governments that plans the regional transportation system. The handling of highly charged issues like the Planned Growth Strategy can set up allies and opponents for years, affecting many other decisions of concern. As chief sponsor of the PGS legislation, Councilor Cadigan held a series of meetings with, and appeared before, the committees of City, County, and State elected officials, the Middle Rio Grande Council of Governments, the University of New Mexico, New Mexico State Land Commissioners whose property was affected by the PGS, and so on.
- Lastly, Cadigan's role involved him in very sensitive negotiations on proposed amendments to the PGS legislation. Over the course of legislative adoption, two full substitute versions were introduced to the original bill and scores of changes were made. Many of these amendments were offered in the Citizens Task Force that met approximately once a week between June 19 and the Council's final hearing in September. In all, Cadigan was involved in 18


negotiating sessions on changes to the PGS legislation. Such a role required detailed knowledge of the specifics of the PGS legislation, careful assessment of the likely distribution of votes, and a poker player's sense of strategy and psychology. In all, Cadigan marshaled this process well given the uncertainty of Winter's support for the bill as described in greater detail below.

In summary, the legislative leaders of such complex action as adopting the Planned Growth Strategy legislation face a remarkably complex and demanding challenge. All the years of consultants' competent technical work in an effort like the Planned Growth Strategy ultimately is placed in his or her hands, as are the aspirations of hundreds or thousands of individuals involved in the effort. The elected leader's role is absolutely essential and there are no schools to prepare one for it. The PGS history also suggests why such efforts are difficult to sustain politically for an elected official. The efforts are time consuming for an official who must attend to multiple issues. The campaign may be too damaging politically in an environment that encourages keeping most people contented.

In short, the PGS history indicates why it is important to have organized and educated community support for good urban growth management and why it is necessary to implement the Planned Growth Strategy completely. Good urban growth management, such as the PGS, needs to become the paradigm for local government action, the operating assumption for elected officials, developers, neighborhood associations, and other activists, as in locales like Arlington, Virginia and Colorado Springs, Colorado. If the approach is tested constantly through incremental legislative and regulatory decisions, it is vulnerable to being unraveled over time.

*Amendments to the Planned Growth Strategy Legislation.* The Council's capacity to amend the original PGS Bill No. O-02-39 had potential not only for clarifying and correcting weaknesses, but also for materially compromising the Planned Growth Strategy. As legislative leader, Councilor Cadigan had the great responsibility to shepherd the PGS legislation. The PGS contained in the original legislation had a varied and mutually reinforcing set of implementation tools. The elements of the PGS approach are represented in Figure 1 and are described in the report Appendix.

All of these tools are needed to effectively carry out the growth management plan and realize its long-term goals. Virtually all of them (long-term vision, Preferred Alternative Land Use Plan, CIP, Development Impact Fees, Zoning, and Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance) came under attack by the Albuquerque progrowth leadership in the course of the adoption process.



**Figure 1. PGS Implementation Overview**

This section describes the contest between defending the PGS legislation and defeating or seriously compromising it. It addresses the “outside” game of the public contest and the “inside” game of work within the City Council and the Citizens Task Force created to review and suggest changes to the PGS legislation. This section is not a complete review of the contest. Rather it is a bare-bones description of what came under attack and how, as well as what was compromised and preserved through the May to September 2002 period. It offers observations on tactical strengths and weaknesses, especially related to the “inside” role of Councilor Cadigan and Council support staff.

The original PGS legislation, Bill No. O-02-39, was amended primarily on two occasions: the initial Floor Substitutes for the PGS Ordinance, Bill Nos. F/S O-02-39 and R-02-111, introduced on August 5, 2002; and the final Floor Substitutes F/S O2-39 (2) and F/S R-02-111 finally adopted on September 23, 2002. (In addition, a third bill had metamorphosed from the original Ordinance, No. R-02-112. Consideration of the third bill continued beyond September.) The effort to defeat or compromise the legislation by the progrowth leadership played out in two phases.

The first phase, the community campaign, took place between May when the first bill was introduced, and August 15, after the initial substitute bills had been introduced and when the schedule called for their final consideration and vote. In the first part of the community campaign, the progrowth leadership privately pressured the Council supporters of the PGS. These attempts to convince through a series of meetings peaked and drew to a close at the end of July when the supporters were not moved. From that point forward, the opposition played political hardball. Recall elections were threatened. Mass mailings were posted. The mayor fully participated in the campaign to discredit and defeat the PGS.

The second phase of the opposition strategy overlapped the community campaign between mid-July, when the Citizens Task Force was formed, to September 23, when the bills were adopted. In this phase, the opposition counted on the members of the progrowth leadership who were appointed to the Task Force to compromise the PGS legislation.

The original PGS Bill No. O-02-39 and the two PGS substitute bills finally adopted are included in the report Appendix.

*Phase One.* The progrowth leadership's campaign to defeat the PGS is summarized in Table 3. It addresses the substantive criticisms of the PGS report and Ordinance made by the opponents, how these criticisms were adopted and amplified by anti-PGS elected officials, and lastly the changes made to the original Ordinance in the first substitute bills.

There were initial assertions that PGS opponents wished to work with bill sponsors on the growth plan: "Our goal is not to stop the Planned Growth Strategy" ("Developers ask", 2002), "Our goal is to educate and work together on a planned growth strategy" ("Discussion urged", 2002). However, after the vote in September, it was reported that "[New Mexicans for Smart Growth] was never in support of this Ordinance. They wanted to fight it from the very beginning". Furthermore, the "decision was unanimous" to oppose the final legislative substitutes for the PGS bill that came out of the Citizens Task Force.

**Table 3. Phase One: The Community Campaign**

Progrowth Leadership Critique	Anti-PGS Elected Officials Critique (Mayor Martin Chavez & Councilor Greg Payne)	Changes Made in First Floor Substitute Bills
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Determines where growth should occur and what it should look like (restricts choice).*</li> <li>○ "Adverse economic consequences".*</li> <li>○ "Shut down" growth in Albuquerque's West Side.*</li> <li>○ Design guidelines inappropriate for West.</li> <li>○ Prioritized growth within Albq's 1960 Boundaries.*</li> <li>○ Automatically directs infrastructure spending to the 1960 Boundaries.*</li> <li>○ Will encourage sprawl outside the city limits.*</li> <li>○ No widespread discussion of PGS Preferred Alternative.*</li> <li>○ "Quit unpredictable" consequences and a "grand experiment" in urban growth management.*</li> <li>○ Negatively impact affordable housing.**</li> <li>○ Rewrites the City Charter and entire City Zoning and CIP program".+</li> <li>○ Adoption process is flawed and requires more additional hearings and review.+</li> <li>○ Colombo "extremely biased dictator to control all of [citizens of Albuquerque's] property rights.+</li> <li>○ Numerous errors in PGS report.+</li> <li>○ Legislation should be Resolution and not an Ordinance.#</li> <li>○ "Lack of clarity in language" of PGS bill.#</li> <li>○ Establish committee to review bill.#</li> <li>○ Include County of Bernalillo in PGS adoption.#</li> <li>○ Need for "substantial discussion involving committees, the County, the City Planning Department, public officials, and others".†</li> <li>○ Will repeal Comprehensive Plan, Area, and Sector Plans.‡</li> <li>○ Development Impact Fees will not be spent in the areas where they are collected.‡</li> <li>○ Taxes and fees will be siphoned away from the West Side of Albq.‡</li> <li>○ Need to have substantial tax increases.‡</li> <li>○ Negative impacts on neighborhoods.‡</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Bureaucrats and "central planners" will tell people "where to live" and "how to live".*</li> <li>○ Siphon tax dollars out of neighborhoods planners "don't like", such as the West Side, and move them into within 1960 Boundaries.*</li> <li>○ Over-rides Sector Plans.*</li> <li>○ Cuts off public investment for employment growth.*</li> <li>○ Entire Capital Improvement Program (CIP) directed to rehabilitation and "repair" needs.*</li> <li>○ Attacks Colombo who "will be in charge of the PGS".*</li> <li>○ Calls for "aesthetically satisfying" neighborhoods and "diverse communities by income, cultural background, age."**</li> <li>○ Increases density to 8 du/acre.*</li> <li>○ Raise taxes.**</li> <li>○ Removes all CIP funds from West Side.**</li> <li>○ Will cause sprawl.**</li> <li>○ Stop growth on the West Side.+</li> <li>○ Calls for slowing down process.+</li> <li>○ PGS is "central economic planning".+</li> </ul>	<p>Substantive:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ PGS Ordinance divided into a Resolution and an Ordinance. Majority of text included in Resolution.</li> <li>○ Policy language about desirability of diverse communities is compromised.</li> <li>○ Identification of groups to be represented on PGS Implementation Task Force and the impact fee subcommittee is dropped. Replaced by percentage of membership to different categories of stakeholders.</li> <li>○ Name of the "Preferred Alternative" changed to "Infrastructure and Growth Plan".</li> <li>○ Project management expanded from City Council Services Dept to include City Planning Dept, County of Bernalillo, and the Albuquerque Public Schools.</li> <li>○ Actual annual dollar amount goals for spending toward rehabilitation and deficiency correction are removed.</li> <li>○ Protections on existing zoning and adopted plans included. Process provisions for consideration of changes strengthened.</li> <li>○ Direction to link the CIP funding sources to types of expenditures (e.g. rehab, growth, Quality of Life projects) is eliminated.</li> <li>○ List of recently adopted plans that were prioritized for PGS incentives is eliminated.</li> </ul> <p>Clarification:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Development Impact Fee language amended to more specifically incorporate the N.M. Development Fees Act.</li> <li>○ Infrastructure and facilities rehab and deficiency correction funds should be provided wherever such needs exist.</li> <li>○ Impact fees to be utilized and spent within service areas where collected.</li> <li>○ Language about an increase in the density cap for Planned Communities to a minimum of 8 du/acre is eliminated.</li> <li>○ The word "exaction" removed.</li> <li>○ New section added: "No provision of this Resolution increases any taxes, rates, or charges . . . . No provision of this Resolution establishes any new zoning categories or applies new zoning to any parcel of land. No provision of this Resolution changes or revokes any approved Capital Improvement Program appropriation. No provision of this Resolution changes any adopted Rank 1, Rank 2, or Rank 3 Plan and no part of this Resolution shall be considered as part of the Comprehensive Plan. The intent of this Resolution is to support and protect the integrity of existing adopted Sector Development Plans."</li> <li>○ No moratorium on Planned Communities, development in Unserved Area, and annexations</li> </ul>

Sources for Progrowth Leadership Critique:  
 \* NAIOP (personal communication, October 22, 2001)  
 \*\* NAIOP (personal communication, April 21, 2002)  
 + Black, J., (personal communication, May 3, 2002)  
 # Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce (personal communication, May 23, 2002)  
 † NAIOP (personal communication, June 1, 2002)  
 ‡ New Mexicans for Smart Growth, (personal communication, June 12, 2002)  
 † NAIOP News (2002)

Sources for Anti-PGS Elected Officials Critique:  
 \* Payne, G. (2002)  
 \*\* Greg Payne, presentation to West Side Coalition, week of July 15, 2002 (personal communication, July 24, 2002)  
 + Martin Chavez, presentation to West Side group, July 23, 2002 (personal communication, July 24, 2002)

As shown in the Progrowth Leadership Critique column in Table 3, the comments do not reflect a balanced assessment and an openness to change. A series of written comments circulated about the Planned Growth Strategy beginning in October 2001, months before the PGS Ordinance was written, indicated that the author(s) simplified and distorted the plan. The outcome of these statements was to reinforce existing biases against government and urban growth management, polarize the issue, solidify group identity, and provide the arguments for the anti-PGS campaign.

The criticisms of the Planned Growth Strategy (describing it as a way to raise taxes, rob newly developed communities of public finances, override existing area and neighborhood plans, shut down growth) were amplified by elected officials opposing the bills as indicated in the second column of Table 3. They needed to add very little to the substance of the PGS charges. NMSG's statement about bureaucrats determining where people should live and what those communities should look like, now turned into accusations of "social engineering" and "central economic planning". The public involvement of elected officials, especially Mayor Chavez and Councilor Payne, beginning at the end of July, coincided with the decision to move the fight against PGS into public arena with mass mailings and attempted coercion of some City contractors.

The opponents had succeeded in their first objective - to slow down the legislative adoption. The legislation had been introduced at the start of May and it was August by the close of Phase One. Importantly, a Citizens Task Force was established by Council at its June 19th meeting. The Task Force included three City Councilors (Winter, Mayer, Cadigan), three developer representatives (Gara, Murphy, Lupton), three neighborhood association representatives (Verrelle, DeWitte [community relation officer for Sandia Laboratories]); and four at-large representatives (Dekker [architect and member of NAIOP], Armijo [County Commissioner], Lucero [attorney and member of NAIOP], Porter [president of League of Women Voters]). The progrowth leadership had moved the discussion into a venue in which they were more comfortable: a committee meeting room relatively insulated from the most vocal PGS supporters. In the past, developer stakeholders had significant influence in these settings. They were adept at developing common strategies and tactics and were influential as a result of their knowledge of the details of real estate development. Moreover, the appointments

to the Task Force contained more critics of the PGS than supporters. Opponents realized that if the bill was compromised through amendments approved by the Task Force it would be very difficult for the Council PGS sponsors to reject them later.

The first two PGS substitute bills, Nos. F/S O-02-39 and R-02-111, did make a number of actual concessions to the criticisms. Some of the more important changes include the following.

- The original Ordinance was split into a Resolution and an Ordinance, compromising its effectiveness to a degree.
- The list of organization stakeholders to be included in the PGS Implementation Advisory Committee and Development Impact Fee Committee was dropped, resulting in far fewer PGS advocates on the committees as later established.
- The proposal to consider linking Capital Improvement Program (CIP) funding sources to types of expenditures (e.g. rehabilitation, cultural projects, growth-related infrastructure) was dropped, resulting in less predictability of funding for rehabilitation and deficiency correction and greater ability to move general municipal revenues into growth related infrastructure.
- One of the first actions of the Citizens Task Force had been to rename the PGS Preferred Alternative Land Use Plan to the “Infrastructure and Growth Plan”. This signaled their attempt to undermine the effectiveness of the PGS land use plan that encouraged compact urban growth, jobs-housing balance, and redevelopment of older neighborhoods.

By mid-August, the public confrontation on the PGS had nearly spent itself and the fight moved "indoors". The momentum of the PGS supporters had been slowed. The PGS legislation had been compromised in some significant ways, but the most important attempt to mortally wound the Planned Growth Strategy would occur in the Citizens Task Force phase of the anti-PGS campaign.

*Phase Two.* The Citizens Task Force began meeting in the second half of June and held 11 sessions prior to suggesting the final proposed amendments at the September 23rd Council hearing. The events of Phase Two are summarized in Table 4. The strategy of the PGS opponents was subtle: they tried to keep the form of the

Planned Growth Strategy while emptying its contents. This effort was led by Task Force member Robert Lupton. He expressed his intent in an email sent on September 20th. Regarding one of his suggested changes, he said, "This totally clears up that the Planned Growth Strategy work that has been done to date is background information for the 'real' PGS to be developed by the later efforts." In other words, the strategy was to turn back the clock to 1997 and begin the PGS over again with the renewed goal of the progrowth leadership controlling its substance.

This was to be accomplished in five main ways:

1. Remove any legislative direction that the Preferred Alternative land use plan contained in the PGS Report be used to guide the establishment of impact fees and the location, phasing, and timing of urban growth;
2. Delete any Council - approved policies contained in Bill No. F/S O-02-39 and R-02-111 that would direct the work of impact fee consultants and the Development Impact Fee Committee, i.e. basing impact fees on the full marginal cost of growth in the three tiers: "Fully Served", "Partially Served", and "Unserved" areas.
3. Ensure that no policies contained in the PGS legislation informed the consideration of development review bodies, prior to their incorporation into future legislation.
4. Materially weaken any regulatory or financial requirements on urban scale development in the Unserved Area at the urban fringe.
5. Free the hand of the Mayor, a PGS opponent and member of the progrowth leadership, to select members of the PGS Implementation Advisory Task Force and the Development Impact Fee Committee.

This was a tactic to set aside the substantial progress that had been made on the urban growth plan: the shell of the PGS was to remain but it would mean almost nothing. The tactic implied that PGS supporters on the Citizens Task Force would need an excellent understanding of the legislation in order to realize the implications of what was being proposed.

Part of the Opponent's approach was to remove Colombo, drafter of the original PGS legislation and the first two substitutes bills, from the Task Force process. A PGS opponent and member of the Task Force asked Cadigan to keep

**Table 4. Phase Two: Task Force Activities**

Progrowth Leadership Strategy	Changes Made in Final Floor Substitute Bills - Compromising	Changes Made in Final Floor Substitute Bills – Positive or Strengthening
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Eliminate legislative direction to use PGS Report as a guide to future work to implement the Planned Growth Strategy. “[T]his totally clears up that the Planned Growth Strategy work that has been done to date is background information for the “real” PGS to be developed by the . . . later efforts.”*</li> <li>○ Delete language to use the PGS Part 2 Report (<i>Preferred Alternative</i>) as guide to the modification of the Preferred Alternative which would serve as the basis of the Capital Improvement Program and Development Impact Fees.*</li> <li>○ Eliminate all references that call for the adopted PGS legislation (F/S O-02-39, R-02-111) to guide future legislation and regulation to implement the PGS. Importantly, this affects the work of the Development Impact Fee Committee, the creation of development impact fees tiers: “Fully Served”, “Partially Served”, “Unserved” Areas, maps of the tiers, setting fees at marginal costs, and has myriad other impacts.*</li> <li>○ Free the Mayor’s hand in making selections to the PGS Implementation Advisory Task Force and the Impact Fee Committee.*</li> <li>○ Adopted policies in PGS bills not have binding force on decisions made regarding land use matters.**</li> <li>○ Materially weaken any regulatory or financial requirements on development in the Unserved Area or in Planned Communities.*</li> <li>○ New Urbanist mixed use zones should not replace existing zoning in new growth areas.#</li> <li>○ Concurrency requirements to be restricted.#</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Removes from Whereas clause that future action should follow recommendations in PGS Part 2 Report.=+</li> <li>○ Removes language that PGS Part 2 Report be used as guide by Impact Fee Committee.=</li> <li>○ Policies adopted in legislation “shall not be used formally, informally, or in any other way in any land use matter . . . until such time as implementing legislation for the policy is adopted.”+</li> <li>○ New Urban Zones are options for new growth areas.+</li> <li>○ A new “Employment Zone” added inconsistent with mixed-use zones originally suggested.+</li> <li>○ Importance of 10-year element of the CIP is compromised.+</li> <li>○ The term “Concurrency” replaced by “Adequate Infrastructure and Facilities”. Strict conditions imposed on adopting future Concurrency regulations.+</li> <li>○ Identified centers and corridors from PGS Report Part 2 are eliminated.+</li> <li>○ Overall policy statements (e.g. diverse communities, priority of existing neighborhoods and business) included in new Bill R-02-112 that later fails to be adopted.</li> <li>○ Unserved Areas / Planned Communities               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Areas are unserved as of date of Development Agreement not of the PGS legislation adoption.=</li> <li>▪ Developers must “assure” rather than “guarantee” financial self-sufficiency.=</li> <li>▪ Meeting interim mixed-use development benchmarks is compromised.=</li> <li>▪ Development Agreement will “evaluate” whether sufficient revenues allocated to infrastructure rehab and deficiencies in existing community rather than be conditional upon these.+</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Professionals working on Impact Fees to be guided by policies in F/S Bill Nos. O-02-39 and R-02-111.=+</b></li> <li>○ Impact Fee Committee to be guided by policies in F/S Bill Nos. O-02-39 and R-02-111.=+</li> <li>○ <b>Policies from the PGS Part 2 Report included in legislation to guide work of updating the Preferred Alternative.=</b></li> <li>○ <b>Council participation in selection of PGS Implementation Advisory Task Force / Development Impact Fee Committee.=</b></li> <li>○ <b>Specific numbers of individuals representing different stakeholders on committees (real estate, neighborhood associations, civic / environmental / religious / educational, business and economic development). 58% are from non-business and real estate groups.=</b></li> <li>○ Overlapping membership of PGS Implementation Advisory Task Force and Development Impact Fee Committee preserved.=+</li> </ul>

Sources for Progrowth Leadership:  
 \* R. Lupton, (personal communication, September 20, 2002)  
 \*\* R Lupton, (personal communication, n.d.)  
 # R. Lupton, (personal communication, September 12, 2002)

Legislation References:  
 = Bill No. F/S O-02-39 (2)  
 + Bill No F/S R-02-111

Colombo from participation in Task Force meetings, and he assented. The consequences of this action appeared almost immediately. Colombo had been scheduled to make a presentation on the PGS Preferred Alternative land use plan. In his absence, one of the consultants who had worked on the plan gave the presentation. This individual doubted the PGS' redevelopment potential (e.g. reusing parking lots, converting low density and more marginal uses to higher ones) in the older areas of Albuquerque and tended to view the situation narrowly in terms of the amount of vacant land. Under questioning, the consultant could not defend some of the aspects of the land use plan and this compromised the credibility of the Preferred Alternative before the Task Force.

The PGS opponents very nearly succeeded in their efforts. Before the last Task Force meeting, all of their five objectives had been accomplished through approved suggested amendments. In the final week before the last meeting, Colombo expressed his dismay about the direction of the Task Force during two meetings with Cadigan. He drafted amendments for Cadigan to present at the last Task Force meetings that strengthened the link between the PGS Preferred Alternative and the final adopted city land use plan; the intent for adopted policies in the PGS legislation to guide future implementation efforts; and Council control over membership in the PGS Implementation Advisory Task Force and the Development Impact Fee Committee. These amendments were adopted in the final hour of the last Task Force meeting.

At the close of this last meeting, the City Council Services director Mark Sanchez asked the Task Force to endorse the PGS as modified by them before the Council and the members agreed to do so. At the ensuing Council meeting, the progrowth leadership again expressed their opposition to the bills, but the Council approved them by a 7-2 vote, with Councilors Winter and Payne voting in favor. A few weeks Mayor Chavez signed them into law.

While the worst outcome was averted, the PGS legislation was seriously diminished by the Citizens Task Force. Existing development approvals were exempt from approved PGS policies until implementing language was adopted. The New Urbanist mixed-use zones were made options along with existing zoning categories. Concurrency would be much more difficult to implement. Guiding policies such as

strong neighborhoods, diverse communities, and prioritizing local businesses were removed from the two PGS bills and the new bill incorporating these policies later failed. Identified Centers and Corridors prioritized for redevelopment in the PGS were removed. Regulatory conditions over development in the Unserved Areas and in Planned Communities were weakened.

*Summary.* From the perspective of supporters of urban growth planning, the problems emerging from this history and are summarized below.

- The opposition's success in breaking the momentum of the PGS community support organizations and Council sponsors by creating the Task Force, slowing adoption, and moving the political process into a controlled and relatively insulated venue.
- Constituting the Citizen Task Force so that it substantially increased the power of the progrowth leadership.
- Accepting the assertions of the progrowth leadership that it did not want to defeat the Planned Growth Strategy but to work with the City Council to improve it. Was the progrowth leadership negotiating in good faith? The record shows that the Task Force was but another vehicle through which the PGS could be undone.

Some of these missteps in approving a strong and effective urban growth management program can be understood in the context of the difficult process of convincing one City Councilor that every effort was made to try to achieve compromise and consensus. The question remains, however, whether an honest attempt to reach compromise while preserving the core of the PGS could have been carried out without putting the PGS at such risk.

*Role of Technical Support Staff.* To initiate and implement a sound urban growth management plan, an essential synergy of roles, individuals, and organizations must occur. For a complex program as this, technical support staff play one of the critical roles. Colombo carried out this function for the City Council and worked closely with Councilor Cadigan and other Councilors and organizations during the adoption process. While providing a positive commentary is not appropriate given Colombo's authorship of this report, a critique of his actions is provided at the close of this section. The following

points address the important role of technical support staff and illuminates aspects of Colombo's background and experience that affected his role in the PGS adoption.

- The Planned Growth Strategy legislation drafted evolved from Colombo's role as the Council's lead staff person for budget and policy issues for more than a decade. The position provided a vantage point on key local government operations, in particular planning and development approvals; water, wastewater, streets, and hydrology infrastructure planning and financing; parks facilities planning and financing; community policing; housing and human service programs; downtown redevelopment; solid waste and fire vehicle standards; and economic development. Facility and vehicle standards are important to urban growth management. New Urbanist Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk said: "When each municipal department – fire and emergency services, public works and sanitation - demands 100 percent adherence to their standards, you end up with a 70 percent place." (Katz, 2000, p. 45). Colombo viewed the Planned Growth Strategy not only as urban growth management but also as a way to reform local government service planning and delivery. In Albuquerque a sizeable percentage of new housing at the fringe (perhaps 25 percent to 50 percent) was purchased by people leaving older neighborhoods. Viewed in this way, the quality of older neighborhoods, including a complex set of issues related to safety, schools, parks, and human services, became an important component of urban growth management. Colombo's experience in local government informed this perspective incorporated into the Planned Growth Strategy.
- Technical expertise is a critical part of the urban growth management mix. Consultant teams are assembled consisting of planners, engineers, GIS specialists, and attorneys. Sometimes consultants actually draft the urban growth management legislation. Very often the consultants work with staff members in local government and educate them during the process to provide continuity in the plan's implementation.

Colombo, as the local technical support staff for the PGS, served as the project manager and authored some report chapters. His role afforded him contact with national and local experts on the consultant team, and his

understanding increased while working with them. He localized the consultant team's findings and recommendations by relating them to Albuquerque conditions, previous planning efforts, results of prior studies, laws and regulations, and so on. He could bridge the consultant team with technical staff members in various related City and County government departments such as planning and public works.

- Colombo was called upon, especially early in the PGS adoption process, to make a number of PGS presentations. These were given to a wide range of organizations including the Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce, Middle Rio Grande Council of Governments, Economic Forum, Albuquerque Interfaith, 1000 Friends of New Mexico, District Coalitions of neighborhood associations, media representatives, and so on as covered in the PGS Master Calendar of Events. (See Appendix) Because he was identified with the Planned Growth Strategy and believed in its value, Colombo was identified as an advocate for the PGS, which complicated and, in some ways, negatively impacted his role as support staff.
- The role of support staff is not just one of providing technical information: when the Planned Growth Strategy report was made public, the consultants' roles largely were completed and they could not truly participate in the "inside" process of legislative adoption. The specifics of the Planned Growth Strategy needed to be mastered by local support staff so that suggestions for changes could be evaluated in terms of their impacts on the system and its effectiveness. The Council sponsors of the legislation depended on the judgment of support staff in this regard. The history of PGS adoption demonstrates that this intense, on-going responsibility involves literally scores of proposed changes and is more complex than understanding the technical implications of a change. It requires an assessment of the tradeoffs inherent in decisions regarding stronger legislation versus broader or more rapid acceptable of change.


By the end of July, Colombo was questioning his role and effectiveness in the PGS process. The political campaign to defeat the plan was disheartening. The loudest voices had distorted the plan to the point that it was almost unrecognizable. He

had been represented in the media as a communist, central economic planner, and a social engineer. Although he was a classified employee, his job was threatened by members of the City Council and others. He had been removed from the center of the PGS legislative action. Under this pressure, he partly disengaged and became more of a spectator to the events unfolding, almost to its end. It was fortunate that he was able to work effectively with Councilor Cadigan at the final hour.

Community Support for the Planned Growth Strategy: Coalition, Campaign, Public Interest, and Grass Roots.

The community effort to support the PGS legislation occurred as a two-pronged effort, the first by the Supporters of the PGS coalition and the second by Albuquerque Interfaith, the grass roots organization. These efforts were coordinated in part because the legislative decision calendar structured both efforts. For the most part, they were independently organized.

The efforts of the support coalition, Supporters of the PGS (SPGS), also encompassed the activities of the political campaign organization (Soltari and the Sage



**Figure 2**

Council) and the public interest group (1000 Friends of New Mexico).

Paradoxically, the work of the coalition was critical to the adoption of the PGS, yet fragile in organizational durability. The varied and required tasks of the coalition are summarized in the text box. Of all the tasks shown, perhaps the most important

ones were coordinating and integrating

the major, distinct efforts being made including those of the elected officials, Albuquerque Interfaith, the political campaign organization, and those of Supporters of the PGS and its affiliated groups. This is indicated in Figure 2. For the political efforts required to enact and implement urban growth management based on Smart Growth principles, no other organization had either the singular focus or the potential political influence as the Supporters of the PGS coalition.

*Forming the Support Coalition.* In general, coalitions are short-term affairs that form quickly in relation to a single issue and as readily lose momentum when the issue fades. The PGS coalition history seems to follow true to pattern, however, this history presents a more complicated picture. The Appendix Master Calendar of Events indicates relatively little activity by member organizations from September 2001 when the Planned Growth Strategy report was made public until nearly May 2002 when the PGS legislation was introduced. Supporters

- | Coalition Functions   |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build and hold together coalition.</li> <li>• Formulate political strategy.</li> <li>• Raise funds.</li> <li>• Prepare informational materials.</li> <li>• Form a speakers bureau - Make presentations before neighborhood, civic, special interest, and business groups.</li> <li>• Obtain endorsements.</li> <li>• Send letters to neighborhood associations.</li> <li>• Arrange for radio and televisions coverage / presentations.</li> <li>• Prepare letters to the editor.</li> <li>• Meet with newspaper editorial boards.</li> <li>• Mobilize supporters to attend public meetings.</li> <li>• Organize speakers at public meetings.</li> <li>• Coordinate activities of coalition members to extent possible.</li> <li>• Communicate and coordinate with elected officials.</li> <li>• Manage the political campaign organization.</li> <li>• Coordinate with the public interest group.</li> </ul> |

of the PGS came into existence in January 2002 and presentations by Council staff were made to SPGS and 1000 Friends of NM in that time frame. A future coalition member, the League of Women Voters, had carefully studied the PGS report since its release.

*“Hitting the Ground Running”:* *Strategy and Tactics.* Supporters of the PGS’ first organizational meeting was held on April 29, 2002. The groups that would be the most active supporters of the growth management plan were involved from this first meeting, including Albuquerque Interfaith, 1000 Friends of NM, League of Women Voters, the Sawmill Community Land Trust, Sage Council, and the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group. Other attendees included Rio Grande Restoration, Amigos Bravos, the Nob Hill Neighborhood Association, Sierra Club, the Grand Heights Neighborhood Association, and others. The first coalition cohort was fairly representative of the community and included church based, grass roots organizations, environmentalists, middle-class public interest groups, and neighborhood associations. Soltari, the political campaign organization, played an active role in this first meeting. Ken Balizer was named the Chair of SPGS. Balizer had been the City Director of Planning; initiated the

Transportation Evaluation Study, the predecessor of the PGS; and at the time was the head of the City's redevelopment agency.

The structure of the efforts to support the PGS, its strategies and tactics, was set in a remarkably short time, within about 30 days beginning at the April 29<sup>th</sup> meeting. Malinda Smith, the director of 1000 Friends of NM, realized that a concerted effort was needed and welcomed Pam Riley's overture on April 24<sup>th</sup> to work for 1000 Friends in support of the PGS. Riley was an experienced community organizer and created an effective synergy with Balizer.

The following consensus was reached easily at the first meeting of the Coalition on April 29<sup>th</sup>:

- The ability of all groups to work independently in support of the PGS was affirmed. Each of the member organizations would be responsible for mobilizing its membership. This avoided the need to come to agreement on all policy matters and was consistent with Albuquerque Interfaith's organizing philosophy.
- Mainstream neighborhood, religious, and business organizations would take the lead in endorsing the plan.
- 1000 Friends of New Mexico would support the Coalition through research, development and distribution of educational materials, public forums, allocation of staff resources including Riley and Smith (1/2 - 3/4 time), and use of foundation contacts to raise funds for the effort.
- Soltari, the political campaign organization, presented an initial concept for a campaign based on direct mail, radio, door-knocking, and so on.

Soon after this meeting, Riley drafted the week-by-week SPGS Action Plan for the campaign beginning May 6 through the Council meeting on June 19. This effort was stimulated by support from a local foundation based on a request for financial assistance on May 6. The Action Plan involved coordinating specific requested tasks of the different organizations and was a sophisticated political program. The campaign including the Coalition Functions included in the text box above. The plan called for a specific focus on Councilor Winter's district, coordinated especially with the League of Women Voters, in terms of outreach to residents and neighborhood associations in

order to secure the critical 6<sup>th</sup> vote in favor of the PGS. Special care was taken to coordinate strategies with Albuquerque Interfaith in the context of their on-going political efforts (City budget adoption, development approval "concurrency" with the public school facilities).

By the end of this 30 day period, Soltari had developed a campaign message for the coalition. At an SPGS meeting on May 25, it was pointed out that in Arizona and Colorado voters rejected growth management referendums by a more than 2-1 margins, where these campaigns were organized around "Smart Growth" messages rather than "appealing to fiscal conservatives". The Soltari representative reported that voters in Winter's District tended to be "over 50 years old, Anglo; and slightly more Republican". He proposed that the PGS be supported in a "fiscally prudent voice protecting the interest of older, current property owners who are concerned that their tax dollars are protecting their property investment." This approach was endorsed at the meeting. By the end of May the community supporters had put in place a coordinated set of strategies and tactics.

*Outreach to Neighborhood Associations, Businesses, and Other Groups.* The Planned Growth Strategy contained a clear direction for controlling growth at the urban fringe in order to revitalize older neighborhoods and small businesses by private reinvestment, better governmental services, and discontinuing across-the-board subsidies for development. SPGS believed that the neighborhood association educational / endorsement program "was essential to the passage of the [PGS] bill" and that, in the long run, "Neighborhood Associations have tremendous influence . . . and can ultimately block or enhance components of the PGS including the infill development necessary". (Riley) SPGS understood that neighborhood associations and small businesses would benefit from the growth plan and were latently supportive of it. Primarily because of the formally structured relationship of City government with neighborhood associations, however, these groups had been reactive and defensive in their actions, focused narrowly within their boundaries. Small local businesses were in a similar, if not worse, situation. The progrowth leadership in Albuquerque (Chamber of Commerce, Economic Forum, Albuquerque Economic Development) was focused on

industrial recruitment. Moreover, neighborhood associations usually did not form allies with their local businesses, making the businesses doubly disenfranchised.

The Action Plan drafted by Riley in the first week of May called for an SPGS subcommittee to target neighborhood associations, small businesses, affordable housing groups, unions, and non-profits. She prepared an introductory letter, educational materials, and a sample PGS support resolution. Riley, Julia Fitzsimmons (a second organizer hired by 1000 Friends of New Mexico), and Laurie Weahkee and Pam Malone of Sage Council carried out this aspect of the support work, together with volunteer neighborhood representatives.

These individuals took on the time-consuming and demanding jobs of making person-to-person contacts with neighborhood association leaders, asking to be added to meeting agendas, arranging for speakers, answering the questions that arose, seeking endorsements, and involving associations that did endorse in the overall flow of the campaign. This effort was initiated by a letter to all neighborhood associations entitled "Why You Should Support the Planned Growth Strategy (PGS)". The neighborhood associations in Winter's District 4 and their neighborhood group coalition were an especially important focus. Councilor Cadigan was scheduled on several occasions to appear before them. This effort was supported by members of the League of Women Voters, some of whom were also association members, and reinforced by the political campaign organizations' activities (autodial, door-to-door canvass, phone bank, direct mailing), summarized below. Additional presentations, by Councilors Cadigan and Eric Griego and other supporters, were made to a number of other neighborhood associations and coalitions, focusing secondarily on Cadigan's Westside District, and endorsements obtained. Efforts also were made to revive a small business group previously organized by 1000 Friends of New Mexico, Businesses for Balanced Growth.

Some noteworthy events occurred in this part of the campaign. In the Downtown Albuquerque area (Council District 1) "Two or three [neighborhood] leaders were very loyal to the mayor . . . and they received substantial funding from the City to run social services and development programs. These individuals attempted to dissuade other neighborhoods from joining the Supporters." (Riley) A number of the PGS opponents'

arguments turned up in conversation with them: PGS would increase housing densities, affordable housing would be lost, Sector Plans would be over-ridden, and so on. These concerns led Councilors Cadigan and Griego to draft amendments to the PGS that specified PGS' impact on zoning, Sector Plans, and the development approval process.

Mayor Chavez' office also was reported to have called many of the affordable housing providers under contract with the City to alert them to possible negative consequences that PGS might have on housing affordability. This led to an Affordable Housing Forum in early June: a debate involving Councilors Griego and Cadigan, Council staff, and PGS opponents.

Lastly, the opponents attempted to intimidate Councilor Cadigan through a direct attack on his own political turf. Mayor Chavez was closely aligned with the head of the West Side Coalition, Larry Weaver, based on their past efforts to build new roads and parks in the area. Weaver, Chavez, and City Councilor Payne held a number of coalition and neighborhood association meetings to bring in opposing speakers and directly criticize the PGS (e.g. all CIP and impact fee revenues collected on the Westside would be spent in other neighborhoods, PGS would "stop growth" and economic development, cause sprawl, over-ride Sector Plans, raise taxes, PGS was "central economic planning", etc.).

The second phase of this attack was to threaten a recall of Councilor Cadigan. Who was behind the recall? The public leaders were Joe Inman, a developer; and Sander Ru and Jeff Armijo, who had run against Cadigan in the last election. Jay McCloskey, the Republican Party executive director, was drawn into the campaign. It was reported that "this effort came from Larry Weaver . . . probably created the scenario where the Westside would lose out". The unknown is whether or not Mayor Chavez also was involved. Some say that he was, he but denied participating. (Cadigan)

By the final adoption date of the PGS legislation in late September, SPGS, working with the City Councilors and other groups, had several accomplishments in this area of work:

- there was a list of 18 neighborhood associations and over 100 businesses and other organizations who endorsed the PGS (See Appendix);
- the critical District 4 (Winter) neighborhood coalition supported the plan;

- New Mexicans for Smart Growth never made inroads with neighborhood organizations in spite of their efforts and no associations opposed the PGS;
- The effort to mobilize the affordable housing providers in opposition and to recall Cadigan failed before really gaining any traction.

There were, however, several limitations to SPGS' achievements:

- Additional staff resources and contingency planning would have improved SPGS' response in defense of Cadigan when attacked on the Westside. (Riley) Cadigan reported that there was "never much political support [from] outside" his District. (Cadigan)
- Riley reported that SPGS "never had the political power to keep the original [PGS] bill intact" as it was being worked on by the Citizens Task Force.
- Working with neighborhood associations, businesses, and other organizations on the urban growth plan takes considerable time and effort that require paid staff. Riley pointed out that this effort "could have been more effective ". These critically important connections were just being formed when the PGS vote was held and the relationships dissipated afterwards. SPGS understood that communication and positive relations with these groups were necessary for long-term success, yet these efforts could not be sustained.
- Support from groups like neighborhood associations, social service agencies, and affordable housing providers was compromised by their financial connections with the City, the on-going nature of their involvement with elected officials, and the willingness of a mayor to exert pressure in these relationships.

*Coordinating the Coalition and Communicating with City Councilors.* One of the essential features of operating both a coalition and a campaign is to communicate and coordinate the actions of the members. This was critical to bridge the gap between the "inside game" of legislative adoption and the "outside game" of community education and mobilization. In this situation, the task involved City Council sponsors of the PGS, the member organizations of SPGS, the political campaign organization (Soltari and Sage Council), and Albuquerque Interfaith.

Between April and September, more than 12 coordinating meetings took place. Interestingly, during the April through July period, there were five meetings among the "outside game" participants and only two including the City Council sponsors. By August and September, there were five coordinating meetings and all of these included City Council sponsors and community groups.

The results of these sessions between City Councilors and community organizations were mixed at best. Although the majority of the City Council supporting the PGS controlled the agenda for consideration of PGS legislation, the time-table kept slipping in response to the progrowth leadership's request for more time for deliberation. The initial strategy of pro-PGS Councilors was to adopt the original Bill O-02-39 at the first Council meeting in June. The SPGS strategy created at the April 29th meeting extended from the beginning of May to June 19th. Delay occurred when the first two Floor Substitute PGS bills were introduced on August 5th slowing the SPGS calendar to a decision date of August 15th. Final adoption on the second set of Floor Substitute bills did not occur until September 23rd. By August 15th, the SPGS (and the work of the political campaign organization) had crested and their activity fell to a very low level in the next critical five week period. This demonstrates the Councilors' inability to control the decision agenda in a manner consistent with the community campaign.

More importantly, it evidences the SPGS coalition's weakness in responding tactically to this extended schedule, refocusing their work on events unfolding in the Citizens Task Force that continued for more than a month after August 15, and developing a new organizing strategy targeted at Councilors Cadigan and Winter, who were brokering PGS amendments.

*The Political Campaign to Adopt Planned Growth Strategy Legislation.* Political campaigns are characterized by central organizations, hierarchies, and use of professional techniques. They are focused on specific political decisions in which everything is won or lost on a given deadline. Campaigns attempt to stay on the offensive and are intended to activate the undecided and reinforce and motivate supporters. In the PGS efforts, the political campaign organization role was played by Soltari and Sage Council. A notable aspect of the work was the integration of Soltari and Sage Council's work with that of the Supporters of the PGS coalition. There was a

productive interplay of these organizations, guided overall by SPGS, but consistent with the community-based political philosophies of Soltari and the Sage Council.

Soltari's original responsibility was establishing the political campaign "message", a strategy, small paid media (radio) campaign, direct mail, earned media materials and events (guest editorials, letters to the editor, press conference), and coordination of a door knocking campaign carried out by Sage Council. Their contribution in establishing the message to support the growth management plan is covered above in "Hitting the Ground Running: Strategy and Tactics". This message "resonated with an important new constituency, the fiscally conservative property owners who were concerned about tax payer issues". (Riley)

The core of their strategy involved targeting and contacting voters in Winter's District 4. There were five steps to this process:

- An autodial (automated telephone) survey contacted all registered voters in the District who had voted recently. This survey indicated whether residents had some level of concern about the City's current growth policies. This occurred in the mid-July time period.
- Starting in mid-July and extending to approximately August 15, Sage Council was door knocking District 4 using the same target list of recent voters employed in the survey. Sage Council staff referred to an informational "rap sheet" prepared by Soltari and left a flyer "Are You Concerned About Property Taxes? Then maybe it's time to get involved in the Planned Growth Strategy". (See Appendix).
- Individuals who responded favorably to the autodial survey and to the door-knocking visit received the first direct mail piece between August 5th and 11th. It focused on maintenance and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure and was titled "\$1.9 Billion Is A Lot of Money. That's how far behind the City is and why we need the Planned Growth Strategy". (See Appendix) The piece also addressed the need for development impact fees and concurrency regulations, reassuring the readers that PGS would not change Sector Plans.
- Between August 12th and 18th, these individuals received the second direct mail piece, "Don't Let Mayor Chavez Sell Us Short! Stop Marty's Taxpayer

Rip-Off!" (See Appendix) It directly linked the mayor to sprawl development and taxpayer subsidies for fringe development and also supported impact fees and concurrency.

- Interested District 4 voters also were contacted by a Soltari phone bank working in mid-August to encourage them to express their support directly for the PGS legislation.

While Riley credits Soltari with creating "a more strategic campaign and one with a high degree of strategic discipline", this advantage contained an inherent weakness. (Riley) The short duration of the PGS legislative process and the specific decision point suggested a political campaign approach. When PGS politics moved "indoors" with the Citizens Task Force and the decision date was extended, however, the campaign peaked, fell away, and was ill suited to the more subtle and personal politics of the Task Force. At that point the political campaign seemed too cumbersome a communication and mobilization method to deal with the intricacies of the Task Force process.

Very early in the campaign related to the release in mid-May of the script of the PGS opponents' television spot (See "Importance of Elected Leadership and the City Council" above), an interesting event took place within the SPGS coalition. At their second meeting, when SPGS assumed a City Council decision date of June 19, they delayed leading with the pro-PGS radio advertisement, recognizing that PGS opponents had virtually unrestricted media funds and a pro-PGS radio campaign would likely trigger a potentially over-whelming response from the opponents. Whether this would have been the actual outcome is uncertain, but the PGS opponents held off their media purchase until the weekend of September 21st and it had little effect on the Council vote.

*Public Interest Group Assists the Coalition Campaign.* 1000 Friends of New Mexico, supporting Smart Growth initiatives, falls neatly into the public interest group category. In general, public interest groups provide information and a sense of passion about new ideas related to urban development, conservation, the environment, and so on. The assumption is that citizens, as individuals, can exert a positive political impact based on information, a belief at the core of "Rational Planning", which is the most commonly used governmental planning approach. (Hoch, 2000, pp. 23-24) Innovative

ideas are expressed in the media, at forums, in newsletters, and before legislative, judicial and regulatory bodies. Public interest roles mostly involve "servicing, steadying and supporting" their allies (Schuck, 1977, p. 135).

1000 Friends of N.M. was arguably the largest and best established planning advocacy group in the New Mexico and Albuquerque when the PGS legislation was introduced. They had strong leadership under Ned Farquhar and had been generously funded by foundations. By the Summer of 2002, however, Farquhar had left the organization, there was new leadership, and funding was drying up. New funding sources for 1000 Friends had encouraged the organization to become a forum for diverse interests to discuss growth and development issues. The new director, Melinda Smith, had been the founding director of the New Mexico Center for Dispute Resolution. The organization debated its core mission. Did involvement in advocacy for Smart Growth ideas marginalize the group in terms of development stakeholders and political decision makers? Is the public interest group model (certainly a necessary condition) a sufficient condition to bring about change in Albuquerque's political context? Was it even possible for 1000 Friends to legitimate itself to the progrowth leadership?

Perhaps the most appropriate comment about the role 1000 Friends in the PGS adoption is that, in the context of uncertainty about the organization's future and its staffing, 1000 Friends realized that the most pressing need was community mobilization and was very generous in support of these efforts. "They knew it would be more effective to have the Supporters [SPGS] take the lead in the outreach, education, and mobilization of target constituent groups such as neighborhood associations." (Riley) They were good coalition players. 1000 Friends had sown the seeds of reform contained in the Planned Growth Strategy. It was time to allow others to mobilize the community in support of those ideas and they recognized it.

1000 Friends participated in the campaign to adopted the PGS legislation in the following ways.

- Committed from two to three Full Time Equivalent (FTEs) staff members from May through September. These individuals included Melinda Smith, the director (fifty percent to seventy-five percent); Albuquerque Area Coordinator, initially Jessica Saavedra followed by Julia Fitzsimmons (fifty percent to

seventy-five percent); and Pam Riley (nearly full time). Riley and Fitzsimmons were assigned to work with SPGS.

- Provided access and support in obtaining funding from a local foundation for PGS work.
- Participated fully in SPGS coalition meetings and coordination meetings with City Councilor sponsors.
- Funded a state-wide survey on growth and development issues that indicated widespread support for maintaining and repairing existing infrastructure and schools and for in-fill development. Identified consistent survey results in District 4 (Winter) which helped inform messaging by Soltari, the political campaign organization.
- Drafted informational pieces regarding the Planning Growth Strategy.
- Phoned 1000 Friends members early in the campaign in May when the PGS legislation was introduced and in preparation for the June 19th Council meeting.
- Carried out a "paid media" campaign with the local newspapers and television stations including letters to the editor, guest editorials, meetings with editorial boards, and a growth management / Smart Growth television show on local public television. Publicized the PGS in the organization's newsletter, *Nuestro Pueblo*.
- Held five Growth Forums from July through September on PGS issues, including: "How should Albuquerque grow in the next 25 years?, Forum to Discuss Albuquerque's Planned Growth Strategy" (April 24); "Affordable Housing and the Planned Growth Strategy" (July 11); "Infrastructure Maintenance, Impact Fees, and the Planned Growth Strategy" (July 23); "Concurrency and the Planned Growth Strategy" (August 1); "Economic Realities and Planning Essential for Genuine Smart Growth" (September 12). (See attached)
- Testified at the Council meetings addressing the Planned Growth Strategy.

Importantly, 1000 Friends staff monitored the activities of the Citizens Task Force and wrote a critique of attempts to water down the original PGS legislation. (See

Appendix, "Keep the Plan in the Planned Growth Strategy"). This was one of the few efforts being made to intervene in the Task Force process. Yet, as a group, community-group supporters of the PGS (e.g. 1000 Friends of New Mexico, Supporters of the PGS, League of Women Voters) never hit on an effective strategy to affect Task Force deliberations.

One consideration in terms of the role of public interest groups like 1000 Friends of New Mexico in the context of the Planned Growth Strategy is the tension between New Urbanist and Smart Growth prescriptions and the process of building a community political base to adopt and implement urban growth management. Development impact fees, concurrency, mixed-use Transit Oriented Development (TOD), Traditional Neighborhood Development (TND) are rarified topics for all but the most passionate about planning and development. Moreover, community organizers believe that citizens will arrive at the appropriate conclusions about issues like urban growth and neighborhood quality through participation and discussion. These may, or may not, be the same conclusions drawn by Smart Growth and New Urbanist advocates. It is necessary to bring these concepts to neighborhood organizations and residents with an openness to the outcome. While 1000 Friends of New Mexico plays a important educational role, it is probably not the same role that one would assume to build the political base to achieve these ends. It is difficult for 1000 Friends, operating as a public interest group, to create the political base to affect major changes in Albuquerque's urban growth management, absent consensus with neighborhoods.

#### Albuquerque Interfaith and the Grass Roots Campaign for the PGS.

Albuquerque Interfaith (AI) is affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and shares the IAF's core organizational philosophy. No other organization in the PGS contest, either in favor or opposed, undertook their community work in the same manner described here for Albuquerque Interfaith. This approach assumes that the people's ability to improve their own lives, those of their neighbors, and their communities is related directly to their political power. IAF organizer, Michael Gegan, explained this as: "when we are called by the . . . leaders of a city, we tell them that we won't come to solve a housing problem or an education problem or a low-wage problem. No, we say we'll try to help them solve a more fundamental problem - a power problem." (Gegan,

2002, p. 9) The means to power, in turn, comes from a strong and durable organization. Organization is built through education and political action. Texan Ernesto Cortez enhanced the IAF's work by bolstering its foundation of moral and ethical values, of service to those in need, and the dignity of the poor. (Shirley, 1997, p. 38).

Albuquerque Interfaith supports "fostering the competence and confidence of ordinary citizens so that they work together to revitalize and improve communities". (Albuquerque Interfaith,2002) For AI this means building a broad-based organization and developing leaders for the purpose of increasing the community's power. Hammond and Milroy said: "A power base allows ordinary people to become extraordinary actors on the broader decisions that impact their own lives and the life of their community." The organization's work on the Planned Growth Strategy is an example of how the apparently complex issue of urban growth management can be drawn upon by a community organization to educate a diverse citizenry and build an organizational base. In turn, Albuquerque Interfaith, like no other support organization, was able to bring a very broad citizen base to the PGS political contest.

Albuquerque Interfaith is not a coalition of groups, that "too often falls apart after a single issue is addressed", but rather an organization made up of dues paying institutions. (Hammond and Milroy) The study respondents said that "power comes in two forms - organized money and organized people. Our work is to organize enough people through our member institutions to help offset the power of organized money". (Hammond and Milroy) By August of the PGS campaign, AI consisted of 27 Catholic, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Methodist, and Unitarian churches, had formal relationships with five schools, and with the American Federation of Teachers, Association of Federal, State and Municipal Employees (AFSME), the Police and the Fire unions. AI coordinated with the Supporters of the PGS coalition, but its work on PGS constituted a second, essentially independent, community engagement in terms of issues, activities, and political mobilization.

*Unfolding the PGS Issue from the Grass Roots.* Albuquerque Interfaith approached the PGS issue through the avenue of involvement in the City's FY/03 budget deliberations. Immediately after the New Year in 2002 and throughout the

Spring, AI focused on threatened cut backs of 150 employees and social service programs. In the process, AI participants recognized that "if more attention was not paid to planning [i.e. PGS] and accountability [i.e. elected officials], the city would only lurch from budget crisis to budget crisis" (Albuquerque Interfaith, 2002) This was no less than a ground-up realization that poor urban growth management wastes resources on unnecessary facilities and infrastructure and on duplicated public services as people move from older neighborhoods to newer ones, leaving declining neighborhood populations behind. This is one important cause of on-going city government budget crises that leads to under-funded facility maintenance and rehabilitation, services spread thin, and lay-offs. One of IA's important contributions to the PGS campaign was linking almost everyone's concerns about public service cut backs and the neglect of older neighborhoods to poor and inefficient urban growth management. Albuquerque Interfaith mobilized over 200 people to the May 2 City Council budget meeting, protested budget cut-backs, and linked them to the absence of the Planned Growth Strategy.

AI overlapped the City budget-cut back focus with one directed toward the Albuquerque Public Schools, with the PGS as the lynch pin. By April, Albuquerque Interfaith had raised the need for "concurrency" development regulations, linking new residential development to school facilities. Concurrency predicates approval of new developments on the review of infrastructure and facilities, like schools, either built or in the capital improvement program, to determine whether adequate capacity exists or will be available in the reasonable future. This approach was associated with their "Healthy Families - Healthy Communities" initiative. IA wrote: "Albuquerque Public Schools has opened four new schools in the last two years, all on the west side [the urban fringe]. However, student enrollment is actually going down. There are over 5,000 'empty seats' in the NE Heights schools. APS has identified over \$1,000,000,000 of existing capital needs. These needs include new construction but are mostly repair, refurbishment, and updating of existing facilities. . . . Albuquerque desperately needs concurrent planning . . . or APS falls further and further behind in its capital needs." (Albuquerque Interfaith, personal communication, n.d.) Government planners and elected officials would probably never have pursued concurrency regulations at this

juncture because they were very controversial with developers. By viewing the PGS from a grass roots community perspective, Albuquerque Interfaith had realized a very important connection between urban growth management and schools. In June, an APS school board member said that the board would "do nothing" regarding the PGS. This would soon change.

*Albuquerque Interfaith's Organizing Actions.* As already stated, AI began 2002 with a focus on the City's budget adoption process, attempting to avoid lay-offs and human service cut-backs, and linking these issues to the need to adopt the PGS. Each month from January to May, Albuquerque Interfaith representatives met with individual City Councilors. They also mobilized their membership to attend the Council's formal budget hearings and be present at votes in January, February, March, at the beginning of May when 200 people attended, and at the final budget adoption at the end of May. As a result of their and others' actions, lay-offs were avoided and cut-backs minimized.

In an unexpected and original way, Albuquerque Interfaith began to support the City Council's adoption of the Planned Growth Strategy by focusing public attention on the Albuquerque Public Schools. Starting in March, Albuquerque Interfaith interwove their City budget focus with one on the Albuquerque Public Schools, linking school facility needs with the adoption of the PGS, while also participating directly in the City Council's consideration of the Planned Growth Strategy. The added value of this approach was that Councilor Winter was an APS high school assistant principal.

In March and April, AI held 27 meetings in homes and member institutions using the "Creating Healthy Communities" briefing paper. (See Appendix). This summary sheet briefly covered concurrency, compact development and infill, stabilizing property values in older neighborhoods, linking capital and operating budgets, and the City's budget adoption process. On April 14th, AI held an informational and accountability session for members of the APS school board and the City Council. More than 300 people attended. An educational session on the relationship between PGS and school facility needs was held on June 4 at the Church of the Risen Savior in District 4 that was attended by both Councilor Winter and APS Board member Paula Maes. In July and August, Albuquerque Interfaith conducted a seminar series, under the Institute for Public Life, entitled "Planned Growth & Albuquerque Public Schools". These session

included: "Funding Public Education and the \$10 Billion Permanent Fund" (July 16); "Projected Economic and Population Growth Patterns for Albuquerque and Their Impact on APS" (July 23); "APS Budget Development" (July 30); "The Impact on APS if City Growth Trend Continues" (August 6); and "The Proposed Planned Growth Strategy" (August 13). (See Appendix) Presentations were made by the Chair of the N.M. House Education Committee, the former dean of the UNM School of Education, the budget director and facilities planner for the APS, and Councilor Cadigan. On average, 75 individuals attended each of these sessions. (Hammond and Milroy) Councilors Cadigan and Griego, in reaction to this work, were drawn into meetings on the PGS with APS superintendents and board members.

While this work was undertaken, Albuquerque Interfaith also mobilized its members and provided public testimony directly related to the PGS bills at the City Council meetings on May 6th (introduction of original PGS bill), June 19th (special Council hearing on PGS), August 5th (introduction of first Floor Substitutes for the original PGS bill), and August 15th (anticipated PGS adoption date). On August 21, more than 50 Albuquerque Interfaith members testified at an APS Board meeting urging the adoption of a resolution endorsing "a planned growth strategy" and better coordinated efforts between the City and APS "to plan for future needs." This APS resolution was passed unanimously by the school board on September 4th. (See Appendix) AI shifted its focus then to the City Council meeting on September 23, testifying and mobilizing its membership in support of the two final versions of the PGS bills that were adopted by a 7-2 margin.

*Continuity of Albuquerque Interfaith's Political Action.* An important but simple fact regarding the value of different sources of political influence is that Albuquerque Interfaith existed prior to the introduction of PGS legislation and continued to operate after PGS' adoption. AI recognized that even if the original PGS bill had been adopted, it would still have met with delay and its implementation manipulated "because of the hostility of the [mayor's] administration toward PGS". (Hammond and Milroy) Respondents reported "the end result for us was a clear understanding that we need to build more power if we want to build a healthy community". (Hammond and Milroy) AI started to prepare for the coming City Council and APS school board elections as early

as the end of August. "Accountability" sessions for Council and school board seats were held later that Fall related to concurrency and implementation of the Planned Growth Strategy. In contrast to the Supporters of the PGS coalition whose campaign activities flagged after August 15, Albuquerque Interfaith's work increased during August and September. SPGS essentially discontinued its work after PGS adoption on September 23, but Albuquerque Interfaith continued to focus on PGS implementation, its relationship to the public schools, and election of candidates in upcoming elections.

*Some Final Comments on the Grass Roots Campaign on the PGS.* By October, the Interfaith Alliance had accomplished a number of substantial goals: they had connected the need for urban growth management to the benefit of a stable local government budget with predictable facility, infrastructure, and operating funding, and they had associated the PGS with well-maintained school facilities and ones built in a timely way related to growth. In short, AI had drawn on its community base to make urban growth management salient to the day-to-day lives of people living both in older neighborhoods and in newly built areas on the urban fringe. Albuquerque Interfaith had expanded the focus of the PGS adoption from the City Council to the Albuquerque Public Schools and thereby doubled the media communications channels on the issue.

By drawing on their large community base, they had an impressive track record of educating the public on a person-to-person basis, participating in City Council and APS meetings, directly contacting elected officials, and mobilizing a large and diverse constituency, including many church leaders, to participate in the PGS adoption process. Lastly, Albuquerque Interfaith, as a multi-issue, membership-based organization, had the continuity of political effort that matched the political tasks not only of adopting the PGS but also implementing it and monitoring its functioning.

Their work was not without challenges. William Peterman summarized 30 years of community development work with a few lessons learned. (Peterman, 2000, p. 155) One of these is that community leaders must "build and maintain strong and direct ties with public officials, technical and financial experts; and other community organizations and umbrella coalitions". Albuquerque Interfaith's accountability sessions with elected officials, requiring these individuals to appear before hundreds of AI members and either support or oppose an overall political position, may be at odds with building these

long term relationships. AI wants elected officials to be responsible to their constituents especially those represented by the organization. Elected officials function in environments with multiple constituencies and nuanced political decisions. Most elected officials rebel against the suggestion that they can be "told" by any person or group how to vote. It pays to treat elected officials in a friendly and respectful way.

This section on Albuquerque Interfaith and the grass roots campaign is closed with the observation of the Supporters of the PGS organizer, Pam Riley: "Albuquerque Interfaith was one of the most effective organizations during the campaign. Their mission is community organizing and they were able to activate a broad based set of leaders from a variety of religious organizations, public schools, and public sector unions."

#### The Progrowth Leadership's Campaign to Compromise the Planned Growth Strategy.

The immediate reaction of the National Office and Industrial Property (NAIOP) local chapter members to the introduction of PGS bill No. O-02-39 in May 2002 was to be "shocked, entrenched, polarized". By the time the City Council considered the final compromise PGS bills (Floor Substitutes for O-02-39 and R-02-111), the leaders of the PGS opponents, constituted as New Mexicans for Smart Growth, voted unanimously to oppose the PGS bills. In September, it was reported that "this group was never in support of [the PGS] Ordinance. They wanted to fight it from the very beginning." The NMSG's (and NAIOP's) final position at Council adoption of the bills was: "While we supported the [PGS Citizens Task Force] effort and hoped that the end result would be legislation we could support, . . . NMSG cannot support them". Given the specifics of NMSG's efforts within the Task Force (See "Amendments to the Planned Growth Strategy Legislation" above), it is clear that only a version of PGS legislation that fundamentally compromised the proposed urban growth management system and turned the clock back to the beginning of the planning process would have been acceptable. This section focuses on the "why", "how", and "who" of the anti-PGS forces activities.

This report describes the arc of PGS opponents' activities to try to halt the bills, their mind set, tactics, allies among elected officials, the individuals who shaped their views, their set-backs and successes, and the "game plan" for engagement in the PGS

after the adoption of the PGS legislation. At the beginning of every effort to adopt a meaningful urban growth strategy, questions and assumptions exist about the motivations and anticipated tactics of the plan's opponents. These inform a wide range of decisions by progrowth management groups and elected officials concerning whether or not meaningful compromise is possible, the timing of legislative adoption, the arguments to be used in support of the growth plan, and the political venues in which the plan is considered (e.g. public Council meetings, "private" meetings with elected officials, special task forces). This section is intended to clarify the question of motivation and how it affects strategy and the repertoire of possible tactics. As previously noted, unattributed quotes are from confidential sources.

In terms of the models of action and roles that frame this analysis, the PGS opponents mobilized through the efforts of:

- Elected officials (Mayor Chavez, principally),
- Technical support staff (Karen Marcotte),
- Public interest group (NAIOP),
- Coalition (New Mexicans for Smart Growth (NMSG) consisting of NAIOP, Albuquerque Economic Forum, Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce, Home Builders Association of Central N.M., Build N.M., Associated Builders and Contractors, and Albuquerque Economic Development), and a
- Political campaign organization (D. W. Turner Public Relations).

The PGS opponents lacked a grass roots organization and failed to have a single neighborhood association endorse their position in spite of their efforts. (See Table 2).

*Anti-PGS Strategies and Tactics.* The strategies and tactics of the progrowth leadership already have been described above primarily in "Amendments to the PGS". The description includes the introduction of PGS Bill No. O-02-39 with enough sponsors to pass the bill. While NAIOP would like to have killed it they could "count the votes" and needed to try to amend it. The story also includes the formation of the anti-PGS coalition, New Mexicans for Smart Growth, to carry out the public campaign against the PGS; the cancelled television campaign by D. W. Turner Public Relations (See "New Mexicans for Smart Growth, Proposed TV Spot #2"); the actions of pro-PGS elected officials including their hard-ball political "inside game"; the misrepresentations of the

substance of the PGS; and the more effective "inside game" of the group's participation in the Citizens Task Force. This story does not require repetition of the information already provided. Rather the remainder of this section deals with elements that have not been covered and provides new analysis.

The anti-PGS coalition, NMSG, were drawn by the introduction of PGS Bill No. O-02-39 into the public arena. The coalition's activities were parallel to those of the PGS supporters in many regards, structured by the Council's legislative process. These are covered in the Appendix "Master Calendar of Events" and include the following:

- Letters sent to the editor of the *Albuquerque Journal*, *Albuquerque Tribune*, and *New Mexico Business Weekly*; meetings with their editorial boards;
- Expansion of the NMSG coalition, nearly weekly meetings of the groups' leaders, fund-raising especially for paid-media spots, and newsletters to members;
- Public testimony at Council meetings and Albuquerque Public Schools Board meetings,
- Letters sent to all neighborhood associations in early August expressing concerns about the PGS legislation and offering to meet with the associations (See Appendix); presentations at neighborhood coalition and association meetings;
- Mass mailings in the second half of July targeted at District 5 (Cadigan), District 8 (Payne), District 4 (Winter), District 7 (Mayer), and District 9 (Cummins) – three of five were PGS opponents (See Appendix);
- NMSG-sponsored research by university economist Brian McDonald who asserted that growth paid for itself (i.e. was not subsidized), and holding a large public meeting in early August to present McDonald's findings;
- Coordination of anti-PGS members of the Citizens Task Force;
- Radio media campaign against the adoption of the PGS legislation on the weekend preceding the Council's vote.

The progrowth leadership was fundamentally at a deficit in the public arena. One observer said: "the public process is totally intimidating to most individuals in the private

business sector . . . the last place you want to be is up in front of the City Council getting slammed and painted as a "greedy developer".

*The Anti-PGS "Inside Game"*. The history of the PGS adoption shows that the progrowth leadership failed to get political traction except when the "inside game" was operative, especially through the vehicle of the Citizens Task Force.

The record indicates a deep seated uneasiness on the part of the progrowth leadership regarding a public contest on the PGS. One respondent said that the development industry was "not used to playing political hard ball". As indicated below, mostly they wanted to communicate the basic message that "growth is good . . . anti-growth is bad." (A side issue is why they came to see the PGS as anti-growth, which it was not.) As discussed above in "Albuquerque and the Growth Industry", the research literature asserts that progrowth leadership attempts to influence the "large arenas of decision making that will determine locational advantages" through such insider means as making substantial campaign contributions, being appointed to boards and commissions, lobbying, and attempting to eliminate "any alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community". (Logan & Molotch, 1987, pp. 30, 51) A public contest on growth can legitimate an alternate path to growth and the community's future.

The story of the D. W. Turner television spot in which infill was depicted as "a dirt lot sandwiched between two run down buildings" is instructive. (See "New Mexicans for Smart Growth, Proposed TV Spot #2" above) According to a source, no one in NMSG "really knew who Doug Turner was". When the Turner media piece was released to the press, the NMSG spokesperson said: "I don't know . . . we're not doing this. If New Mexicans for Smart Growth was doing this I would know about it." The television news reported that NMSG "had no idea where the ad script came from . . . and that it will not air". (10:00 pm news,2002). In fact, Mayor Chavez and Councilor Payne were in the middle of the media effort. The progrowth leadership's need to control the inside game of politics drew them into alliance with Chavez and Payne. In turn, these elected officials were pulling the regime into a hard-edged media campaign and into other more extreme political tactics that were not their normal territory.

The hard-ball inside game to stop the PGS was carried on instead by the politicians and their community supporters. These efforts included:

- Acting within the NMSG leadership group to polarize the sides and convey a "don't compromise one bit kind of attitude";
- Attempting to intimidate City affordable housing providers, redevelopment contractors, and Council and Administration staff;
- Distorting the actual contents of PGS plan and legislation;
- Coordinating the effort of a Westside neighborhood coalition leader and aspiring Westside politicians in a threatened recall campaign against Councilor Cadigan. The recall stalled as an inside move: at the critical public meeting, there were 30 people in attendance, only seven of whom were not organizers of the effort. These individuals mostly spoke in favor of Cadigan. ("West Side recall", 2002)

The most effective anti-PGS inside game revolved around the creation and activities of the Citizens Task Force, formed in mid-June and working through September 23. The underlying assumption of a Task Force is that its members are open to reasonable compromise. This ostensible position was given by a former NAIOP president: "Our goal is not to stop the Planned Growth Strategy" and "Our goal is to educate and work together on a planned growth strategy " ("Developers ask" 2002; "Developers urge", 2002) Other evidence presented here indicates that more conciliatory NAIOP / NMSG members were selected to represent the group in public venues, but these members apparently did not reflect the inflexible views of the NMSG leaders. The inside strategy of delay, review, and amendment was supported by another member of the progrowth leadership, the *Albuquerque Journal*. In a June 24, 2002 editorial, the *Journal* advised: "The council should give interested parties as much time as they need to analyze this [PGS legislation], line by line. . . . Any plan of this breadth and reach needs second and third opinions on all its provisions before the council can act responsibly". ("Growth strategy needs", 2002) The Citizens Task Force was created on June 19th and its membership was weighted in favor of the PGS opponents. While NAIOP and NMSG were well represented, the best informed community advocates of the PGS (1000 Friends, Supporters of the PGS, etc.) were

excluded. As described above (See: "Amendments to the Planned Growth Strategy Legislation"), the progrowth leadership attempted to remove the substance of the PGS from the legislation. Their spokesperson remarked "this totally clears up that the Planned Growth Strategy work that has been done to date is background information for the 'real' PGS to be developed by the later efforts". Not only would this wipe clear the substantive work that had been done, but the "real PGS" also would be guided by a PGS Implementation Task Force and Development Impact Fee Committee whose members would be controlled by Mayor Chavez. This strategy was nearly successful. At the outset of the final meeting of the Task Force, all the objectives of the progrowth leadership had been incorporated into draft amended PGS bills. This action was in concert with Mayor Chavez, who worked to render it ineffective from behind the scenes, while appearing to be supportive in the final period before the September Council vote.

*Mind Set of the Anti-PGS Leaders and the Role of Technical Support Staff.* The nature of the PGS opponents as a "group" is instructive in terms of their reactions to the PGS, willingness to entertain compromise, and the influence of different individuals on both the group and the political process. The core of the PGS opponents group included major developers, large land owners, heads of building and construction companies, real estate brokers and agents, and related service professionals including private sector architects, planners, engineers, and attorneys. In addition to these core members, the leadership of the development group overlaps in terms of board memberships with Albuquerque's economic development groups and the Chamber of Commerce. There were regular, generally monthly, meetings of these organizations and it was possible for group leaders to interact with one another on a nearly weekly basis. The National Association of Office and Industrial Properties (NAIOP) is the leadership organization of the development group and when an issue like PGS arises, forms the leadership of the Albuquerque progrowth group. (See "Albuquerque and the Growth Industry" above) NAIOP has monthly membership meetings generally attended by several hundred people with a speaker who is a member of the progrowth leadership or a real estate educational presenter.

Literature on group attitudes and dynamics, beginning with Sumner's Folkways book of 1906, casts light on what occurred in the PGS contest and provides insight about how conflict might be avoided and compromise made more likely. (Sumner, 1906) The theories addressing "ethnocentrism" are applicable to inter- and intra-group dynamics.

The self-view of NAIOP in the PGS contest might be characterized as "noble", "misunderstood", and "besieged". This is evidenced by the following statement regarding the NMSG's media campaign: "As is

usual the development community feels that nobody 'tells their side of the story' . . . and if somebody did, nobody really wants to listen . . . so here we went . . . to once again try to educate and inform the 'public' thinking that somehow this might influence people [to think] as we do as an industry . . . growth is good . . . anti-growth is bad . . . the politicians want to raise your taxes and make it harder to do business in our community and 'we' as an industry generate taxes . . . we supply what the market demands." It was in this context that the introduction of PGS Bill No. O-02-39 with enough co-sponsors to adopt it "sent a shock wave through the development community and the usual defensive reaction was taken when anybody sees a government entity trying to legislate change". While there is evidence that NAIOP members believed they were beset, this is the reaction of a group with a sense of entitlement over the control of development and the illegitimacy of government to control urban growth.

The development group believed that PGS represented "radical change". While PGS represented a paradigm shift in urban growth management, it also required a multi-year process of implementation for such key elements as impact fees, new mixed-use zone categories, concurrency, joint use planning with the public schools, all of which would require future legislation and gradual change. So why was PGS perceived as an immediate radical change and how did this come about? One answer to this

#### Facets of "Ethnocentrism"

- See selves as virtuous and superior. See others as contemptible, immoral, inferior.
- See own standards of value as universal and intrinsically true.
- See selves as strong, others as weak.
- Cooperative relations with ingroup members. Absence of cooperation with others.
- Respect for ingroup authorities. Lack of respect for others' authorities.
- Willingness to remain ingroup member. Unwilling to join others.
- Blaming others for ingroup troubles.
- Distrust and fear of the others.

From Robert LeVine & Donald Campbell, 1972, pp. 7-21.

involves the role played by the technical support staff person for both NAIOP and NMSG, Karen Marcotte. The technical support person was a principal of a planning consulting firm, Consensus Planning, representing many of the large land owners at and beyond the urban fringe (John Black and Quail Ranch, Westland Development, Campbell Ranch) and had served as president of NAIOP in 2000. She was the "technical go-to person" for the developers, NAIOP, NMSG, and the Mayor, who were faced with a complex piece of legislation and trusted the technical support person to interpret it for them.

As indicated in Table 3 (See: "Amendments to the Planned Growth Strategy Legislation" above), the progrowth leadership's critique of the PGS misinterpreted the plan seven months before the PGS bill was introduced (e.g. shuts down growth on Albuquerque West Side, directs all infrastructure spending to older neighborhoods, determines where growth should occur and what it will look like). ("NAIOP's initial", 2001). NAIOP could have asked for alternative perspectives. NAIOP, consciously or unconsciously, had shifted very early into campaign mode to oppose the PGS. Throughout this period, the technical support person supplied the arguments that contributed to the polarization of the sides.

Generally after the introduction of the PGS bill in May and peaking in late June and early July, the anti-PGS campaign began to scapegoat the opposition. The N.M. Business Weekly called PGS bill sponsors on the Council a "Gang of Five" who were "warring against Albuquerque's wage earners". ("Planned growth battle ", 2002) Mayor Chavez referred to Albuquerque Interfaith as "very radical", "very marginal", "far left". ("Group enriches debate", 2002) Councilor Payne targeted "City Hall bureaucrats [who] tell people how they ought to live" in a "centrally planned Brave New World" (Payne, 2002) PGS proponents were identified as "social engineers", "socialists and communists" and the fight to stop the PGS became not only a political objective but a "moral" one as well. This political fomenting around the Planned Growth Strategy was notably carried out by the progrowth leadership's main political supporters, Mayor Chavez and Councilor Payne. They drew upon NAIOP's criticisms, simplified and amplified them, and contributed their own claims. (See Table 3 in "Amendments to the Planned Growth Strategy Legislation" above) These elected officials needed the

support of the progrowth leadership. In turn, they had to prove their value to the regime: the devil of the PGS had to be conjured up before it could be dispatched

While these actions tended to polarize the PGS opponent and proponents, the Citizens Task Force was reported to have opened lines of communication, clarified a number of misrepresentations, and moved some NAIOP members more toward the center. It was reported that "certain measures taken by the Council to reach compromise took a lot of the wind out of the more hard core [opponents]", to some degree, because 'the 'hidden' agenda mentality was neutralized to a certain extent".

*Continuity of Work to Stop the PGS.* Like Albuquerque Interfaith and the pro-PGS City Councilors, the political strength of NAIOP is linked to the continuity of its political presence. Immediately after the passage of the two PGS bills in September, NAIOP focused on the next efforts to compromise the plan:

- Working with the Mayor to appoint anti-PGS members to the Implementation Advisory Task Force and the Impact Fee Committee;
- Supporting the election of anti-PGS candidates to the City Council the following October; and
- Lobbying the Albuquerque Public Schools to counter moves to integrate their facility planning with the City infrastructure and development approval processes under the PGS.

*Concluding Remarks.* The willingness to compromise implies that one might lose more by fighting and foregoing the possibility of a middle ground. It implies a level of respect for people with different perspectives, as well as the willingness to empower these individuals by including them in the process. The inflexibility of the PGS opponents was an expression of their confidence about political control. An unresolved question for the author beginning this report was whether or not a more compromising approach would have been more productive at the start of the PGS legislative adoption. Although unpleasant, as the foregoing account attests, the hard ball campaign to pass the PGS was necessary given the realities of its opposition. Mobilizing the community to support urban growth management and to thwart the continued attempts of the progrowth leadership to compromise it was necessary to set the conditions for a working relationship and meaningful compromise with the pro-development group.

Ultimately, a changing landscape of development in Albuquerque, with more wide-spread and profitable infill opportunities, will be important also in securing a viable and stable urban growth management program.

### Findings and Recommendation Regarding Future Support of Urban Growth Management and Smart Growth.

While the combination of efforts in support of the PGS won the battle for the adoption of the PGS bills, the campaign approach together with the coalition's form, ultimately contained weaknesses that continue today. Soltari's and Supporters of the PGS' work was targeted to an August 2002 Council meeting. After this date, the effort dissipated. Subsequent to the bills' adoption in September, the pro-PGS campaign dissipated and the growth management effort was dealt a blow in the committee selections for the PGS Implementation Advisory Task Force and the Impact Fee Committee. Mayor Chavez seeded these committees with vocal PGS opponents, including Lynn Johnson, the director of NAIOP, and Robert Lupton, and included realtors and developers to fill seats designated for neighborhood representatives. While NAIOP members were appointed to the committee, there were no appointees from 1000 Friends of New Mexico, Supporters of the Planned Growth Strategy, or Albuquerque Interfaith, the groups that had been instrumental in passing the PGS legislation. The strength of the PGS legislation has helped offset this weakness, but, ultimately, NAIOP may snatch victory from the jaws of defeat if the actions described below are not taken.

Models of Action and Roles The PGS adoption reflects distinct models of action and roles, strategies and tactics, and their interaction and adjustments in the dynamic flow of events. The agents of change include:

- Elected officials,
- Technical support staff,
- Political campaign organization,
- Public interest group,
- Coalition, and
- Grass roots organization.

Perhaps the most important lesson is that each of these organizations has a distinct and important role in the adoption of urban growth management and Smart

Growth legislation. All are needed to achieve important changes and all need to be respected, included, and supported.

Continuity of Action. Achieving effective urban growth management and Smart Growth is an on-going activity which requires the continuity of effort that only can be provided by long-lived organizations. The Supporters of the Planned Growth Strategy coalition is the only group focused exclusively on these efforts. As such, SPGS must be reactivated with funding secured for staffing and operations. SPGS must make the transition from a temporary coalition to an on-going community group. SPGS' work must include continual engagement / education / coalition development with neighborhood associations and small businesses, which are the natural allies of these efforts. NAIOP and other members of the progrowth leadership will continue efforts to undermine the PGS. Failing to counteract these activities is likely to lead to the ultimate defeat of the PGS.

Albuquerque Interfaith, the grass roots organization, played a critical role in the PGS adoption. They mobilized many supporters, educated a great number of individuals, and created a salient political connection between urban growth management and people's everyday lives. It is critical that Albuquerque Interfaith be supported financially, engaged in urban growth / Smart Growth issues, and their work coordinated with those of SPGS. Albuquerque Interfaith is more advanced organizationally than SPGS, hence greater emphasis has been placed here on SPGS.

Legitimization of Pro-PGS Groups. The political weakness of the pro-PGS groups is manifest in their lack of representation on the Citizens Task Force and on the PGS Implementation Advisory Task Force and the Impact Fee Committee created after the PGS adoption. The common mind-set of elected officials is that developers and other members of the progrowth leadership are stakeholders and natural members of these groups, as are neighborhood association representatives. But the pro-PGS and Smart Growth groups are not. As discussed above, this situation places an enormous amount of informal, but real, control into the hands of the pro-development group. Either this mind-set needs to be broadened or the urban growth management groups must continue to work with neighborhood associations to convey the importance of city-wide and regional growth / urban growth management on the health and quality of their

neighborhoods. A strong focus of the PGS is good quality, older neighborhoods. This work needs to be further developed by the SPGS and Albuquerque Interfaith.

Working within Task Forces and Committees. The history of the PGS campaign shows that the pro-PGS groups were particularly ineffective when the action moved "inside" to the Citizens Task Force's meeting rooms. The recommendations above call for an objective of gaining greater legitimacy for urban growth supporters such as Supporters of the PGS, Albuquerque Interfaith, and 1000 Friends of New Mexico. Even when these groups are invited to sit at the table, it is important that they consciously engage in the committee or task force process. The text box contains a set of ground rules for participating in these groups. It is clear that the anti-PGS groups followed most or all of these.

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| <p>Conditions for Participation in Task Force or Committee</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The organization is stable, has sound leadership, and a reasonably large and active membership.</li><li>• Organization has independent access to technical assistance. This function may be performed by the organization's staff, faculty members from a local university, capable volunteers, or consultants.</li><li>• Groups and individuals invited to participate in the process, and the decision-making rules, are conducive to addressing the organizations' legitimate concerns and suggestions, and ensure their inclusion in the final recommendations.</li><li>• The organization is committed to meet independently to monitor the task force process and develop strategies for participating in the effort.</li><li>• The task force process is used consciously as a way for organization members to learn and be empowered.</li></ul> |
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Taking the Growth Plan to the Community Perhaps the biggest lesson in this story is that urban growth plans like the PGS contain many elements that make great sense to the community: efficiency in infrastructure and facility construction; stewardship of the public's assets represented by these facilities; preservation of older neighborhoods; the creation and fostering of community; coordination of home building with the provision of schools and parks; establishment of good quality, mixed-use commercial and industrial centers; and local government being proactive in guiding growth, based widely held principles within the community. The biggest difference between the PGS and previous growth related plans in Albuquerque is that the PGS was taken to the community for its support. It would not have been possible to adopt the PGS legislation without this approach. At the same time, involving the community entails all the forms of political engagement identified: pro-PGS coalition,

grass roots organization, political campaign organization, public interest group, and elected officials.

*Final Comment.* When the dust had settled on the PGS fight, Mayor Chavez, addressing 250 NAIOP members, said: "You are getting your ears boxed - they have out-worked you and out-organized you. They have gone door to door, started phone banks and elected candidates." What Chavez did not say was the adoption of the Planned Growth Strategy helped to change the very political landscape in Albuquerque.

Many challenges still lie ahead, but with the partnership of local and national foundations, the Albuquerque region and its neighborhoods can become different, better places to live and work. People's lives can be changed for the better. They can overcome the political cynicism and disengagement cause by others' manipulation of the democratic process. They can experience that their efforts *do* make a difference.

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